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Annus Mirabilis

**Actions by the Israeli Government to Annex the West Bank,
2023–2025**



Photo: Oren Ziv

“The Jewish people have an exclusive and inalienable right to all parts of the Land of Israel. The government will develop and promote settlement in all parts of the Land of Israel—in the Galilee, the Negev, the Golan, and Judea and Samaria.”

[Guidelines for the Establishment of the 37th Government of Israel](#)

May 2026

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In accordance with a requirement established by legislation initiated by the Israeli government as part of its campaign against organizations that criticize its policies in the occupied territories, Peace Now notes that in 2025 the majority of its funding came from foreign governmental entities that are friendly to Israel. Details are available on the Registrar of Nonprofits' website.

Key Data from the Report

- In 2023–2025, 185 new outposts were established in the West Bank, approximately 130 of them farm outposts and “hilltops.”
- According to the report’s assessment, farm outposts currently effectively control more than 1,070,000 dunams — approximately 18% of the West Bank.
- In 2025 alone, approximately 300,000 dunams were added to the areas over which settlers took control through farm outposts.
- Only approximately 40% of the areas controlled by farm outposts are defined by the Civil Administration as “state land”; the remainder includes private land, waqf land, land not subject to formal land settlement, or areas whose status has not been mapped.
- In 2023–2025, 118 Palestinian shepherding communities and shepherding clusters were expelled, primarily as a result of settler violence, denial of access to pastureland and water, and the absence of effective protection by the authorities.
- During the government’s three years, plans for 40,064 housing units in settlements were advanced; in 2025 alone, 27,941 housing units were advanced — more than double the previous annual record.
- In 2023–2025, settlers took control of at least 11,520 dunams for agricultural purposes, through plowing, planting, and denying Palestinians access to their lands.
- Since the government was formed, and even more so after October 7, 2023, at least 223 kilometers of new dirt roads have been opened across the West Bank, along with the upgrading of dozens of kilometers of existing roads.
- In 2023–2025, Israel declared 25,959 dunams as state land, nearly half of all land declared state land since the Oslo process began.
- The government decided to allocate NIS 244 million to initiate land settlement proceedings in the West Bank. The report warns that this could lead to large-scale dispossession of Palestinians from their lands.

Executive Summary

A joint report by Peace Now and Kerem Navot examines profound changes in the West Bank brought about by Israel's 37th government since December 2022. The report concludes that the government has advanced de facto annexation at an unprecedented pace. It has done so through structural governance changes, settlement expansion, the retroactive authorization of outposts, land seizures, the expulsion of Palestinian communities, and increased Israeli control in areas previously under Palestinian Authority responsibility.

The current government has transformed Israel's control mechanisms in the West Bank. The key change was the transfer of broad civilian powers from the Civil Administration and the military chain of command to Minister Bezalel Smotrich and the Settlement Administration within the Ministry of Defense. Smotrich described this as "changing the system's DNA."

The new authority covers planning and construction, land registration and management, infrastructure, roads, nature reserves, archaeology, and enforcement. This shift created a new civilian-political mechanism effectively controlled by the government's most extreme elements. It enables rapid and systematic advancement of annexation objectives while bypassing the limited checks previously in place within the military and legal systems.

In addition to this structural change, the government established and strengthened the Ministry of Settlement and National Missions, led by Orit Strook. This ministry serves as a governmental mechanism for channeling hundreds of millions of shekels to organizations involved in settlement expansion and land takeover in the West Bank.

These budgets, alongside security and infrastructure budgets, help establish and entrench illegal outposts, particularly farm outposts, many of whose residents are involved in violence and the expulsion of Palestinian communities.

A key indicator of recent changes is renewed settlement activity in the northern West Bank. The government effectively lifted the ban on Israelis entering areas evacuated under the "Disengagement". It resumed efforts to establish the settlements of Homesh, Sa-Nur, Ganim, and Kadim, as well as additional settlements and outposts, in the Jenin and Nablus regions.

Simultaneously, the government is promoting tourism projects and archaeological sites, such as Sebastia and the Mas'udiya railway station, as part of a broader effort to shape the northern West Bank.

The report also points to a dramatic shift in planning. In June 2023, the government removed the requirement for the Minister of Defense's approval at each stage of settlement construction planning. It transferred authority over the pace of these plans to Smotrich.

As a result, over the past three years, plans for 40,064 new settlement housing units were advanced, supporting potential future growth of 160,000 to 200,000 settlers. In 2025 alone, 27,941 units were advanced, more than doubling the previous annual record.

One of the most significant approved plans is for the E1 area, which is expected to fragment the West Bank further and severely undermine the possibility of developing Palestinian territorial continuity between Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Bethlehem.

While advancing official construction, the government is also promoting the retroactive authorization and development of illegal outposts. In May 2024, a list of 70 outposts was published, and Smotrich instructed them to be funded and developed, despite their illegality. Many of these outposts are focal points of settler violence.

Over the past three years, 185 new outposts were established, including approximately 130 farm outposts and "hilltops."

The pace of establishment increased from year to year, indicating an increasingly professionalized mechanism of land takeover that exploits the war and the fact that, in practice, there is no enforcement against Israeli construction, in order to create new facts on the ground.

Farm outposts play a central role in expulsion and dispossession. According to our assessment, farm outposts currently effectively control more than one million dunams — approximately 18% of the West Bank.

In 2025 alone, approximately 300,000 dunams were added to the areas settlers took control of through farm outposts. Only approximately 40% of these areas are defined by the Civil Administration as "state land"; the rest are private land, waqf land, or areas whose status has not been mapped. This means that the mechanisms of grazing, violence, and denial of access enable a de facto takeover of lands that cannot officially be allocated to settlers.

The direct result is the systematic expulsion of Palestinian shepherding communities. In 2023–2025, 118 Palestinian shepherding communities and shepherding clusters were expelled, primarily as a result of settler violence, denial of access to pastureland and water, the establishment of nearby outposts, and the absence of protection by the army and police.

According to data from B'Tselem, in the first two months of 2026, another 9 communities and families were expelled, among them Ras Ein al-Auja, the largest shepherding community in Area C, with approximately 1,000 residents.

Between 2023 and 2025, settlers also took control of at least 11,520 dunams for agriculture, primarily through seasonal plowing and planting date groves and grape and olive vineyards, with the aim of entrenching the denial of Palestinian access to their lands.

Since the government was formed, and even more so after October 7, 2023, settlers have paved at least 223 kilometers of new dirt roads across the West Bank and upgraded dozens of kilometers of existing roads.

These roads facilitate the establishment of outposts, land takeover, and blocking Palestinian access to their lands. Many were built on private or non-state land, including areas within Area B. The report identifies government funding sources, including ‘security components’ budgets, settler authorities’ land patrol departments, and a January 2026 government decision allocating NIS 125 million to “paving security routes.”

According to data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), demolitions by Israel in Area C due to construction without permits increased by about 80% from 2010–2022 to 2023–2025. The average rose from 537 structures per year to 966 during the current government’s three years.

The demolition of Palestinian structures is part of a broader system aimed at preventing Palestinian development. At the same time, the government continues to plan, fund, and retroactively authorize Israeli settlements and outposts built in violation of Area C planning and construction laws.

The chapter on land takeover details a significant acceleration in legal and bureaucratic mechanisms of takeover. Between 2023 and 2025, the government declared 25,959 dunams as “state land,” nearly half the total area declared since the Oslo process began.

Additionally, expropriations, seizure orders, jurisdictional changes, and reductions in firing zones were advanced to expand settlements. The government also decided to initiate land registration proceedings in the West Bank and allocate NIS 244 million for this purpose. This could lead to large-scale dispossession of Palestinians who may struggle to prove ownership under the conditions Israel will set, potentially resulting in state registration of their land.

Land takeover processes now extend beyond Area C. The government has begun to erode the authorities granted to the Palestinian Authority in Areas A and B.

This is evident in an order banning Palestinian construction in the area designated as the 'agreed nature reserve', a February 2026 cabinet decision removing the Palestinian Authority's demolition powers in Areas A and B for cases defined as harm to heritage sites, the environment, or water sources, and the transfer of planning and construction authority at the Cave of the Patriarchs and the Hebron settlement enclave to the Civil Administration.

These actions undermine the administrative framework established by the Oslo Accords and expand Israeli control into areas designated for Palestinian administration during the interim period. In practice, the government is working to dismantle this framework.

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Introduction

More than three years have passed since the current government, the sixth administration led by Benjamin Netanyahu, took office. This period has been among the most challenging for the West Bank since 1967. The formation of the 37th government in December 2022 accelerated processes that led to significant changes in the West Bank. These changes are linked to the transfer of authority over administration, planning, and law enforcement to Minister Bezalel Smotrich. He is associated with some of the most extreme elements in Israeli society. He serves in what is widely seen as the most nationalist and racially exclusionary government in Israel's history.

This document reviews these changes three years into the government's term. As long-term monitors of the Israeli project of dispossession and settlement, we have shifted our focus from daily incidents of violence and politically motivated crime to provide a comprehensive and current overview, recognizing that the changes in the West Bank during this period are unprecedented.

In the investigative program "*Zman Emet*" (Real Time), broadcast on Kan 11 on December 8, 2025, Settlement Affairs Minister Orit Strock, a resident of the Jewish settlement in the heart of Hebron, [said](#): "In three years, we are correcting thirty years of the damage caused by the Oslo Accords." The road to achieving the "corrections" Strock referred to involves, among other things, a fundamental change in the military chain of command and the takeover of critical nodes within the Israeli government:

Smotrich's takeover, together with his associates' takeover of the Civil Administration and its transformation into a civilian body, the budgets channeled to the settlements, and the appointment of Avi Bluth as Commander of the Central Command in July 2024, are what enabled many of the measures we describe below. It is reasonable to suggest that the recent appointment of David Zini, who was raised and educated in ultra-Orthodox nationalist circles and institutions, as head of the Shin Bet may facilitate an environment where violent actors operating in the West Bank feel emboldened to act without fear.

The effective abandonment of the police to Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, a repeat offender convicted of incitement and support for terrorist activities, has significantly contributed to the deterioration of conditions in the West Bank to their current low point.

A recent dramatic consequence of these changes was the expulsion of about 1,000 residents from Ras Ein al-Auja, the largest herding community in Area C, in January 2026.

Over the past three years, a war has been taking place in Gaza that is more brutal than any of its predecessors. The war began with the heinous massacre by Hamas against Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023. It evolved into a brutal conflict during which Israel committed serious war crimes. These led to the near-total destruction of the Gaza Strip and large parts of southern Lebanon, and to the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians, thousands of Lebanese, and Israelis.

A similar conclusion appears to have been reached by the International Criminal Court, which issued international arrest warrants against several senior Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.

It is increasingly evident that troubling patterns seen in military conduct during the wars in Gaza and Lebanon are now present in the West Bank. Thousands of soldiers, police officers, and settlers have been deployed for extended periods. Settlers operate in various capacities: some serve in autonomous military units such as Regional Defense Units (Hagmar units), others in army-supported paramilitary groups, and some as civilians. All appear to act independently, often with the approval or encouragement of military command.

The war that began on October 7 broke out amid a political crisis over the current government's efforts to change Israel's institutional foundations and governing principles. A significant portion of the settler right supports this overhaul, believing it will enable the formal annexation of the West Bank. However, the Trump administration opposes annexation, and Israel is now more politically and militarily dependent on the United States than before.

At this stage of the bloody conflict over this land, it is clearer than ever that determined international intervention is required. This intervention must remove control of the West Bank from the State of Israel and compel it to dismantle the mechanisms of military control and apartheid it has become addicted to.

At the outset of this report, we intended to complete it by the end of 2025. However, the many events required that we extend our work into the first quarter of 2026. During this time, the trends analyzed in this document persisted and intensified. On February 8, 2026, the political-security cabinet adopted several significant decisions. Because of their importance, we included them in the first chapter, even though they occurred beyond the original chronological scope of this report.

This report does not purport to cover all the practices and methods through which Israel operates in the West Bank. One aspect that is absent from this document, and which is perhaps the most important of all, is violence by settlers and soldiers against Palestinian residents.

These amount to thousands of incidents, ranging from verbal abuse to murder. The vast majority of these incidents are neither documented nor counted by any authority, as they do not meet the threshold for news reporting. This violence is part of a funded and institutionalized system whose purpose is to expel Palestinians and take over their land.

The report is organized into four chapters. The first chapter analyzes the administrative changes implemented by the government that have significantly influenced recent developments in the West Bank. It also examines the appointment of Avi Bluth as Commander of the Central Command. Major General Bluth grew up in the settlement of Neve Tzuf (Halamish) and studied at the pre-military academy in Eli before joining the army. In our view, his appointment marks a new chapter in cooperation between the military and settlers, and helps explain developments we have not seen before.

The second chapter addresses expulsion and dispossession on the ground, taking place on a scale and at a pace not seen since 1967.

The third chapter examines the steps taken to develop the settlements themselves, including decisions to establish settlements and legalize outposts, as well as the advancement of plans for future construction.

The fourth chapter focuses on the mechanism for taking over additional land.

A. Administrative Changes — From Regime Overhaul to Annexation

1. The Establishment of the Settlements Administration — “Changing the System’s DNA”

In the coalition negotiations after the 25th Knesset elections, the Likud and Religious Zionism parties agreed on several structural changes to the bodies administering the West Bank.

The aim of these changes was, as Minister Smotrich described it, “[changing the system’s DNA](#).” This change removed authority over the management of Area C from the previous Civil Administration and transferred it to the civilian deputy to the head of the Civil Administration. The civilian deputy reports directly to the Settlements Administration within the Ministry of Defense, which Minister Smotrich oversees.

The [annex](#) to the coalition agreement signed on December 1, 2022, established Smotrich’s appointment as a minister in the Ministry of Defense, responsible for the activities of COGAT and the Civil Administration (Section 6.4).

While Smotrich’s actions in the West Bank remained formally under the purview of the Minister of Defense (Section 21.1), the agreement provided for the creation of a [Settlements Administration](#) within the Ministry of Defense, with Smotrich authorized to appoint its head (Section 21.8). Subsequently, Yehuda Eliyahu, a [longtime associate](#) of Smotrich, was appointed to lead the Settlements Administration.

It was also agreed to transfer legal advisory authority over Israel’s actions in the West Bank from the Civil Administration to the Ministry of Defense, placing it under the supervision of the “additional minister,” Smotrich. Moshe Frocht, a resident of the Ibei HaNahal outpost and former land coordinator of the Gush Etzion Regional Council, involved in many cases of unlawful takeover of Palestinian-owned land, was appointed to lead the legal advisory unit.

On May 29, 2024, Hillel Roth, a resident of the settlement of Revava (and formerly a resident of the settlement of Yitzhar), was appointed [Deputy Head of the Civil Administration for Civil Affairs](#). However, the title “deputy” in this case is misleading. On the day of the appointment, the head of the Civil Administration, Brigadier General Hisham Ibrahim, was compelled to sign an [order](#) transferring [dozens of civilian authorities](#) that had until then been vested in the head of the Civil Administration to his new “deputy,” Roth.

These authorities include responsibilities such as [land management and registration](#), infrastructure and road construction, urban planning and building, enforcement or non-

enforcement of construction laws in Area C, management of nature reserves, and oversight of archaeological excavations. Together, these powers are essential for shaping reality on the ground.

In late December 2025, the Civil Administration offices moved from the military base near the Judea and Samaria Division in Beit El to the Sha'ar Binyamin industrial zone. This move, dubbed "[making history](#)" by a settler media channel, marks the transfer of authority over West Bank management from the military to the most extreme settler factions.

2. Ministry of Settlements

The [coalition agreement](#) between Likud and the Religious Zionism party included a clause (6.4) providing for the establishment of a "Ministry of Settlements and National Missions," to be headed by a minister from Religious Zionism. MK Orit Strock, a resident of the Jewish settlement in Hebron, heads the ministry.

In practice, the Ministry of Settlements functions as a government mechanism that distributes hundreds of millions of shekels each year to non-governmental bodies engaged in education, "Jewish identity," and, of course, settlement activity and the takeover of land in the West Bank.

The ministry is also responsible for the [Settlement Division](#), which oversees a substantial portion of the land Israel has taken over in the West Bank for settlement enterprise. Through the Ministry of Settlements, the government has transferred tens of millions of shekels each year to illegal outposts, particularly to farm outposts whose residents are involved in violence against Palestinian communities.



Minister Smotrich at the Settlement Regulation Conference, June 9, 2024

3. Repeal of the Disengagement Law and the Prohibition on Israelis Entering Settlements Evacuated in 2005 in the Jenin Area

In the summer of 2005, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and evacuated four settlements in the northern West Bank near Jenin: Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh. Afterward, the Knesset passed the Disengagement Law, which barred Israelis from entering the areas Israel had left. For the next 20 years, the land between Nablus and Jenin was made up of Palestinian communities without Israeli civilians, except for the illegal outpost at [Homesh](#).

A few months after the establishment of the current government, on March 21, 2023, the Knesset passed a [law](#) lifting the prohibition on Israelis entering the areas of the four settlements evacuated in the northern West Bank. The immediate purpose of this law was to enable the [legalization of the outpost at Homesh](#).

Because the law enacted by the Knesset does not apply directly in the West Bank, it was implemented through a military order [signed](#) by the then Commander of the Central Command, Yehuda Fuchs, on May 18, 2023. The order [permitted Israelis to enter only the area of the Homesh settlement](#), while the rest of the area remained closed to Israelis on security grounds.

Shortly thereafter, construction of the yeshiva at Homesh began. The yeshiva was built at the initiative of the government and with the involvement of the IDF, even though the construction was carried out in violation of planning and building laws—without approved building plans and without a building permit.

About a year later, on May 10, 2024, Major General Fuchs signed an [additional order](#) permitting Israelis to enter the areas of the settlements of Sa-Nur, Ganim, and Kadim. A year later, on May 18, 2025, [the cabinet decided](#) to reestablish the settlements of Homesh and Sa-Nur, as well as Har Eival, north of Nablus. On December 11, 2025, the cabinet also decided to reestablish the settlements of Ganim and Kadim. On March 25, the cabinet [decided](#) to establish additional settlements in the Jenin area: Alonei Shomron, Maayanot, Noa, Emek Dotan, Rum Gilboa, and Taanach.

Following these decisions, Central Command Commander Avi Bluth signed orders defining the jurisdictional boundaries of the settlements of Sa-Nur (on November 9, 2025), [Homesh](#) (on December 28), and Har Eival (on December 28). Work on their establishment began during the first months of 2026.

To enable the reestablishment of the settlement at Sa-Nur, the government is planning to pave a new bypass road that will allow settlers to reach the site without passing through the town of Silat al-Dahr and nearby villages. To that end, Central Command Commander Avi Bluth signed a [seizure order](#) for approximately 500 dunams of privately owned and cultivated Palestinian land, on the grounds of “security necessity.” In recent months, clearing and infrastructure work have begun in preparation for settlers’ return to Sa-Nur.

Alongside the advancement of settlements in the area between Nablus and Jenin, the government is also promoting the establishment of two tourist sites: at the archaeological site in the [village of Sebastia](#), where approximately [2,000 dunams were expropriated](#) (on February 11, 2026), and at the Mas’udiya railway station, near Sebastia, where a “heritage site” on the history of settlement is being built with a government investment of approximately [NIS 3.5 million](#).

In addition to these settlements, the IDF has begun constructing new military bases in the area between Nablus and Jenin, including the [Menashe Brigade base](#), which currently operates within the Green Line. To complete the picture, it should also be noted that the government has approved the establishment of new settlements in the northern West Bank: Maoz Zvi, Rehaniya, and El Naveh west of Jenin, and Bezek, Goder (Tevetz), and Tamun east of Jenin. All of these measures are intended to advance Israeli control over the northern West Bank as part of broader annexation efforts.



The water tower in the evacuated settlement of Homesh, whose reestablishment was approved by the government.

4. The transfer of planning and construction authority to Minister Bezalel Smotrich

On June 18, 2023, the government [decided](#) to amend Government Resolution No. 150 from 1996. This decision eliminated the government's direct control over planning procedures in the West Bank. Until then, the Minister of Defense had been required to approve every stage of settlement planning: the discussion of the plan deposit, the publication of the deposit, the discussion of final approval, the publication of final approval, and the stages of authorization for planning and for construction.

The new decision removes the need for the Minister of Defense to approve every stage. Plans can now move forward at a pace set by the Civil Administration's professional staff, who report to Minister Smotrich. Political echelon approval is required only at the planning allocation stage, before plans are prepared, and at the construction allocation stage, after plans are approved. This government decision [grants Minister Smotrich this authority](#).

Following this move, the Higher Planning Council approved settlement construction plans at an unprecedented rate. In 2025, [27,941 housing units in settlements were advanced](#), more than [twice the previous annual record](#) from 2023.

5. The Stripping of Demolition Powers from the Palestinian Authority

The 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) between Israel and the PLO temporarily divided the West Bank into Areas A and B, comprising about 39% of the West Bank, which were transferred to Palestinian control and administration. Area C, covering around 61%, remained under Israeli control pending a permanent agreement that was expected to be concluded in May 1999.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, whose first government was sworn in in June 1996, refused to implement the stages of Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank. Instead of advancing a permanent status agreement as set out in the accords, he reopened issues that had already been settled. In October 1998, the PLO and the Government of Israel signed the [Wye River Memorandum](#), which provided, among other things, that approximately 3% of the West Bank—territory Netanyahu had refused to transfer to the Palestinians—would be handed over to the Palestinian Authority as Area B, under a special designation as a “nature reserve,” where construction would be prohibited pending a final status agreement. Years passed and, famously, most provisions of the Oslo Accords were not implemented.

Between 2022 and 2024, Palestinians began developing infrastructure and building in the northern part of the “agreed nature reserve,” east of the settlements of Tekoa and Nokdim. In response, settlers launched an aggressive campaign demanding that the government block what they called “the new Arab city in the Judean Desert.”

During Major General Yehuda Fuchs’s tenure as head of Central Command, he declined to sign an order prohibiting construction in the area, arguing the matter was political rather than security-related. However, after Avi Bluth was appointed Commander of Central Command in July 2024, one of his initial [orders revoked the Palestinian Authority’s demolition powers](#) in the “agreed nature reserve” and imposed a “Restriction on Construction Order (Agreed Nature Reserve),” prohibiting construction in the area.

Soon after, Civil Administration inspectors issued numerous demolition orders targeting Palestinian structures. In December, the Administration [demolished](#) several buildings within the reserve. These actions [halted](#) Palestinian construction projects and caused substantial financial losses for developers. Concurrently, settler outposts began appearing throughout the reserve, displacing Palestinian shepherds who had previously lived in the area.

About a year and a half later, on February 8, 2026, the cabinet decided to [strip the Palestinian Authority of certain powers](#) across Areas A and B. Under the decision, Israel will assume the authority to demolish Palestinian construction and development in areas under Palestinian Authority control if they are deemed to harm heritage or archaeological sites, the environment, or water sources. These are broad and loosely defined categories that, in practice, could be used to halt virtually any Palestinian construction or development project across the West Bank.

In addition, the cabinet decided to transfer planning and construction authority at the Cave of the Patriarchs and in the settlement area within the city of [Hebron](#)—authority that, under the Hebron Protocol signed between Netanyahu and Arafat in January 1997, had been assigned to the Palestinian Municipality of Hebron—to the Civil Administration.

6. Government decisions on land settlement

On May 11, 2025, the [cabinet opened land settlement proceedings](#) in the West Bank. Following the decision, the Minister of Defense stated in a [public announcement](#) that its purpose was to “strengthen, consolidate, and expand Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria.” This decision may indeed enable large-scale dispossession of Palestinians from their land in Area C.

Following the cabinet decision, preparatory work was carried out to establish the settlement procedures. On February 15, 2026, the [government allocated](#) NIS 244 million for land settlement in the West Bank, to be administered by Israeli land registration bodies within the Ministry of Justice and the Survey of Israel.

Land settlement” is a state-initiated process intended to establish final ownership in designated areas. Landholders are invited to submit documents and evidence of their claims, and, following verification and surveying, ownership is determined, parcels are defined, and the results are recorded in the land registry. Land registration in the West Bank began in the final years of the British Mandate and continued under Jordanian rule.

By the time Israel captured the West Bank in June 1967, the British and Jordanian authorities had completed land settlement for roughly one-third of its area. The remaining two-thirds were left unsettled, with ownership records based on property tax registers. Israeli authorities, for their part, do not recognize these registers as proof of land ownership.

In 1968, the Military Advocate General, Meir Shamgar, decided to suspend land settlement proceedings because, under international law, Israel’s military rule, by its nature temporary, was not authorized to continue a process with long-term legal consequences. Shamgar’s decision was based partly on the fact that during the war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled the West Bank. The question of their return remained unresolved at the time.

The cabinet’s decision in May 2025 to open land registration proceedings is intended to achieve precisely what Shamgar had warned against: the dispossession of [hundreds of thousands of Palestinians](#) who own land in Area C by registering their land in the name of the state. Under the government-initiated process, Palestinians will be required to prove ownership under conditions most landowners will be unable to meet, resulting in the land being [registered to the state](#).

7. The Extension of the powers of the Urban Renewal Authority to the West Bank

In recent years, Israel has enacted several laws to encourage urban renewal and higher-density construction, thereby increasing the number of housing units in cities. These laws provide the government and local authorities with tools to encourage developers to undertake urban renewal and redevelopment projects.

After this legislation, the Government Authority for Urban Renewal was established to support these efforts by financing planning, assisting developers and residents, and sometimes contributing to construction costs.

On December 9, 2024, the Central Command commander [signed a military order](#) extending Israeli urban renewal laws to settlements beyond the Green Line. [The order](#) establishes a “Government Authority for Urban Renewal in the Judea and Samaria Area,” which is, in effect, the same authority that operates within Israel—the same personnel and the same budgets—but, because it operates in territory that is not part of the State of Israel, it is formally designated as “the authority in the Judea and Samaria Area.”

The significance of this move is that government funding can be directed to support the planning and implementation of redevelopment and other urban renewal projects in settlements, and to encourage large-scale, high-density construction. In addition, the Urban Renewal Authority will be able to designate areas in settlements as redevelopment zones, allowing developers and residents to benefit from substantial tax incentives worth millions of shekels—from VAT exemptions on construction to exemptions from purchase tax and capital gains tax.

Through these measures, the government aims to promote large-scale construction projects to add housing units in settlements, thereby significantly increasing the settler population while maintaining relatively affordable housing prices.

8. Cabinet Decision on Land Purchases by Israelis in the West Bank

On February 8, 2026, the cabinet approved [changes to the rules](#) governing land purchases in the West Bank, intended to open the real estate market to settlers. These changes also present significant risks of corruption and fraud. All decisions require corresponding amendments to military legislation before taking effect.

These decisions also include the repeal of a law, in force in the West Bank since the Jordanian period, under which only West Bank residents or companies registered there may purchase land. Removing this restriction will allow settlers to purchase land directly from Palestinians, without the need to register a company, and to register land in their own names. In addition, the cabinet decided that the state will resume purchasing land in the West Bank on its own initiative.

In addition, the cabinet decided to eliminate the requirement for a *heter iska* (transaction permit) for land purchases. *A heter iska is a key step in land acquisition procedures in the West Bank, intended to prevent fraud and to curb real estate initiatives that are not aligned with government policy.*

The cabinet has also approved a measure to open West Bank land registries to public access, aiming to facilitate land acquisition and potentially fraud. Previously, these registries were confidential to help prevent fraud, protect the property of Palestinians who left the West Bank, and ensure the safety of those who sold land to Israelis.

Public access to the registries may enable settlers to identify landowners, apply pressure to sell, and potentially falsify sales documents.


B. Expulsion and Dispossession


1. The establishment of outposts and farm outposts

The most striking changes in the West Bank over the past three years are the establishment of new outposts and the expulsion of Palestinian shepherding communities. Since the current government took office, 185 new outposts have been established, including approximately 130 farm and “hilltop” outposts. Some receive institutional support, while others result from local initiatives that authorities typically do not bother to dismantle or prevent from being reestablished, even after rare evacuations.

Residents of these new and older farm outposts are responsible for much of the violence and terrorism against Palestinian residents. Our comprehensive report, [“The Bad Samaritan”](#) published in April 2025, details this phenomenon, its consequences, and the extent of government involvement.

Analysis of outpost construction between 2023 and 2025 reveals a rapid acceleration in outpost establishment. This suggests that the underlying mechanism is becoming more effective, taking advantage of the ongoing conflict, which the Israeli government diligently maintains, partly to allow settlers to expand into more areas of the West Bank.





.The "Dvash MiSela" farm outpost near the village of Huwara in the South Hebron Hills

2. The Takeover of Land


We estimate that farm outposts now control over one million dunams, or approximately 18% of the West Bank. This figure is based on fieldwork, interviews with Palestinians, and analysis of aerial imagery. It excludes areas settlers have seized through construction or agricultural cultivation.

In June 2022, Kerem Navot published the report [The Wild West — Pasture, Plunder, and Pillage Around Shepherd Outposts in the West Bank](#). The report found that through 77 shepherd outposts established across the West Bank, settlers had taken control of approximately 240,000 dunams, about 7% of the West Bank.

By the end of 2024, we estimated that settlers controlled roughly [786,000 dunams](#). A year later, the figure had risen to approximately 1,070,000 dunams (1.07 million), an increase of about 300,000 dunams in a single year, driven by 57 farm outposts established during 2025.



A review of land status in areas taken over by settlers through farm outposts shows that about 419,000 dunams are classified as “state land.” This classification is based either on registration in the land registry during the Jordanian period or on Israel’s declarations beginning in the early 1980s.

This means that only about 40% of the land seized through grazing is defined by the Civil Administration as state land. The remainder consists of privately owned land (both registered and unregistered), land registered to the Islamic waqf, or land whose ownership status has not been mapped by the Civil Administration and therefore cannot be allocated to settlers for any purpose.




Over the past three years, we have documented a consistent pattern of land takeover within Areas A and B, which were transferred to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords, with the apparent aim of undermining those agreements. This takeover occurs both through the establishment of outposts in Areas A and B and, more significantly, by preventing Palestinians from accessing land in these areas. Settlers residing in outposts in Area C carry out these actions through the systematic use of violence.

In our assessment, settlers currently block access to approximately 100,000 dunams within areas under Palestinian Authority control.



Takeover of Land Within the Palestinian Authority



By the end of 2025, there were 20 outposts within areas under Palestinian Authority control, all established between 2023 and 2025: 12 within the “[agreed nature reserve](#)” east of the settlements of Nokdim and Tekoa, 7 in Area B, and 1 in Area A.



An outpost established in 2025 within the "agreed nature reserve."


3. The allocation of grazing land

On February 10, 2025, Yossi Segal, the Custodian of Government and Abandoned Property in Judea and Samaria, signed six [notices](#) of intent “[to approve temporary permits for the use of state land for grazing](#).” Each notice was accompanied by a [map](#) and stated that objections could be filed within 30 days, but none specified to whom the land would be allocated or for how long. The total area covered by these allocations is approximately 16,200 dunams, all of it within areas effectively controlled and used by settlers, including for grazing. The publication of such notices of intent to allocate land for grazing was a first of its kind, and followed a [petition to the High Court of Justice](#) filed by Peace Now, in which the Court ruled, in December 2024, that the state must publicly disclose in advance any intention to allocate land outside the boundaries of settlements.

About two-thirds of these areas lie within zones designated as closed military training areas (“firing zones”), which the army has not in fact used for decades.

Another method of taking over land that has gained significant momentum over the past three years is the placement of barriers and blockades. In the West Bank, these fall into two main categories: (1) iron gates and earthen roadblocks installed by the military on access roads to Palestinian communities; and (2) iron gates and improvised barriers installed by settlers—often with military backing—on roads leading to open areas that settlers are seeking to take over.

These two systems operate in tandem, with the shared aim of controlling Palestinian movement and preventing access to as much land as possible. [According to data published](#) by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were 925 barriers and blockades in the West Bank as of April 2026.



Map attached to a notice by the Custodian of Government and Abandoned Property authorizing settlers to graze livestock on ~2,400 dunams in the Ras Ein al-Auja area.




A settler's cattle herd in the northern Jordan Valley

4. The takeover of land for agricultural use


Between 2023 and 2025, there was a sharp increase in the amount of land taken over by settlers for agricultural use. At this stage, we do not have a complete mapping of the phenomenon, but the scale is unprecedented, amounting to at least several thousand dunams, and very likely more. Most of this land was, until recently, cultivated by Palestinians who were displaced from it.

In most cases, the takeover is carried out through seasonal plowing, intended to rapidly establish facts on the ground. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the southernmost part of the Hebron Hills, in the area of the settlements Tekoa and Ma'ale Amos, as well as in various locations along the Allon Road. Alongside this method, there is also a more resource-intensive form of land takeover. This mainly involves the seizure of open land for date plantations in the Jordan Valley and along the northern shore of the Dead Sea, as well as vineyards and olive groves in the central highlands.

According to the partial data currently available, settlers took over approximately 11,520 dunams for agricultural purposes between 2023 and 2025. The largest area was taken over in 2023, totaling 6,217 dunams. Nearly half of the increase in agricultural land that year occurred in the southern Jordan Valley, for the establishment of date plantations.



Settler takeover of land for vineyard planting, east of Itamar settlement.




5. The Expulsion of Palestinian Communities

The first expulsion of a Palestinian shepherding community by settlers from shepherd outposts took place in 2019, after Neria Ben Pazzi established the “Rimonim Farm” outpost. Within a year, four Bedouin families were expelled from land belonging to the village of Taybeh, where they had been living.

The second documented expulsion occurred in summer 2022, when the [Ras al-Tin community north of Kokhav HaShahar was expelled](#). Between early 2023 and the outbreak of war on October 7, five more Palestinian shepherding communities were expelled: three along the Allon Road and two in the southern Hebron Hills.

With the outbreak of the war, a wave of community expulsions began and continues to this day. Between 2023 and 2025, 118 shepherding communities and clusters were expelled (some of which at times belong to a single parent community). In addition to these, according to data from B’Tselem, [a further nine communities and families were expelled](#) in the first two months of 2026, the largest of which is Ras Ein al-’Auja.



Khirbet al-Hamra after its residents were expelled by settlers in October 2023.



Residents of the Wadi Qelt community leaving their homes following settler violence, July 2025.

6. Road Construction

Since the establishment of the government, and particularly from October 7, 2023 to mid-2025, settlers have opened hundreds of new dirt roads across the West Bank, totaling at least 223 kilometers. They have also upgraded dozens of kilometers of existing roads. Settlers use these roads to seize hundreds of thousands of dunams, establish new outposts, and restrict Palestinians' access to their land.

We mapped a total of 223 kilometers of roads, of which:

- Approximately 110 kilometers were constructed on privately owned Palestinian land or on land not classified as state land.
- Approximately 17 roads or road segments totaling about 4.8 kilometers were opened within Area B, which is under Palestinian administrative control.

Road construction on this scale requires tens of millions of shekels in investment and reflects an organized, well-financed effort funded by public funds. We are aware of two official government sources that fund road construction in the West Bank.

One is a budget line titled “[Security Components for Settlement Points](#),” approved as part of coalition funds and used to finance outposts and farms, including road construction. Another is an annual allocation of about [38 million shekels](#) for [land patrol units](#) in settlement local authorities, which also covers road construction.

In addition, there is an unofficial funding channel through settler-controlled local and regional councils.

On January 25, 2026, the government approved the [allocation of 125 million shekels](#) for 2026–2027 for the construction of “security roads.” The decision does not specify which government ministry will administer the funds.

No comprehensive plan has been prepared for these roads, and none has been formally approved or issued a lawful building permit.

To the best of our knowledge, the Israel Defense Forces’ Central Command is involved in many road openings and provides legal justification by designating them as “[necessary for security purposes](#).” In numerous cases, the head of Central Command has issued seizure orders for security needs to enable road construction or to legalize existing roads retroactively.

For further details on road construction, see the report “All Roads Lead to Annexation” on the Peace Now website.

7. Fencing along bypass roads

Between 2023 and 2025, settlers fenced off vast areas of land, [mainly](#) where Palestinian communities had been expelled. This aimed to establish settler control and prevent Palestinians from returning.


The fencing runs along the Allon Road, the Jordan Valley Road, and along the eastern section of Route 505 (between the Allon Road and the Jordan Valley Road). A smaller portion was fenced along the southern section of Route 317 in the southern Hebron Hills.

Dozens of Palestinian shepherding communities and families used to live along these roads. As mentioned earlier, settlers, with help from the military, forced them to leave their homes.

The fencing along these roads is intended to convert these areas into grazing land, primarily for cattle. To this end, settlers also make use of Israel's national road authority guardrails, which, over long stretches, serve as a substitute for fencing.

To date, we have mapped over 51 kilometers of fences. Along with guardrails, these barriers restrict access to hundreds of thousands of dunams of land that settlers have taken over in recent years.

In addition to fencing along bypass roads, settlers have fenced off other extensive areas. Still, because we do not currently have precise mapping of them, they are not included in the figures presented here.



Fences purchased by the settler Noam Jackson of Gitit Farm outpost to fence off land south of the outpost.

In two cases, we identified the individuals responsible for ordering the fencing. The first is Noam Jackson, who established an extremely violent farm outpost east of Gitit and has seized thousands of dunams nearby. The second is Eliav Liby, who, with his brother Harel Liby, owns Talmonim Technical Supply Ltd. Liby is involved in the takeover of tens of thousands of dunams between Allon Road and Route 90 (the Jordan Valley Road).



Fences ordered by Talmonim Technical Supply Ltd., owned by the brothers Eliav and Harel Liby.

8. Barriers and Checkpoints

In the past three years, the use of barriers and blockades to take over land has increased significantly. In the West Bank, these measures fall into two main categories: (1) iron gates and earthen roadblocks installed by the military on access roads to Palestinian communities, and (2) iron gates and improvised barriers installed by settlers, often with military support, on roads leading to open areas targeted for takeover.

These two systems operate in tandem, with the shared aim of controlling Palestinian movement and preventing access to as much land as possible. According to data published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were 927 barriers and blockades in the West Bank as of April 2026.




Checkpoint at the southern entrance to Nablus on Route 60. The road was closed immediately after October 7, 2023.

9. House Demolitions

Between 2023 and 2025, the number of demolitions carried out by Israel in Area C on the grounds of construction without permits rose by about 80 percent, from an annual average of 537 structures in 2010–2022 to 966 per year under the current government (according to [OCHA data](#)).




Screenshot from the Facebook profile of the Head of the Gush Etzion Regional Council, in which he links the demolition of structures in the village of Beit Ummar and the al-Aroub refugee camp to lobbying efforts by settlers



Source: [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs](#) (data as of February 3, 2026).

The sharp increase in demolitions is driven first and foremost by government policy, which directs the Civil Administration's enforcement unit to intensify its activity. In addition, between 2023 and 2025, the unit's budget increased by about 40 percent [compared with the average for 2018-2022](#), enabling, in turn, an expansion of its operations.



*The 2025 budget reflects the original allocation; execution data have not yet been published.

Source: Ministry of Finance budget execution reports.

In addition, the government has approved the [creation of a new unit](#) within the Israel Land Authority's Land Protection Division to carry out enforcement and home demolitions in the West Bank. [According to Minister Smotrich](#), the unit is expected to employ 70 staff members once fully operational (by comparison, according to Ministry of Finance budget execution data, the Civil Administration's enforcement unit had about 55 staff in 2025).

The Land Protection Division uses advanced AI tools to monitor construction. We expect their deployment in the West Bank to increase the scale of demolitions.

Needless to say, under the Netanyahu–Smotrich government, the enforcement unit operates almost exclusively against Palestinian construction and carries out almost no demolitions of illegal settler construction.

C. Settlement Development

1. The establishment of new settlements

Since taking office in December 2022, the government has approved the establishment of 102 new settlements in six separate cabinet decisions:

February 2023 – [9 settlements](#)

June 2024 – [5 settlements](#)


March 2025 – [13 settlements](#)

May 2025 – [22 settlements](#)


December 2025 – [19 settlements](#)

March 2026 – [34 settlements](#)

Of the 102 settlements approved, 50 are entirely new settlements, 15 are “neighborhoods” of existing settlements that are being granted independent settlement status, and 37 are illegal outposts that the government intends to legalize.



Most of the new settlements are deep inside the West Bank, in areas where there is no Israeli presence, and are intended to deepen Israel's hold on these areas and prevent Palestinian development.



List of Settlements the Government Decided to Establish

#	Decision Date	Settlement Name	Area	Type
1	12/02/2023	Avigayil	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
2	12/02/2023	Beit Hogla	Jericho	Legalization of an outpost
3	12/02/2023	Givat Arnon	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
4	12/02/2023	Haroeh	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
5	12/02/2023	Malachei Hashalom	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
6	12/02/2023	Mitzpe Yehuda	Jerusalem	Legalization of an outpost
7	12/02/2023	Asa'el	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
8	12/02/2023	Sde Boaz	Bethlehem	Legalization of an outpost
9	12/02/2023	Shaharit	Qalqiliya	Legalization of an outpost
10	27/06/2024	Evyatar	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
11	27/06/2024	Adorayim	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
12	27/06/2024	Givat Assaf	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
13	27/06/2024	Nahal Heletz	Bethlehem	Legalization of an outpost
14	27/06/2024	Sde Efraim	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
15	22/03/2025	Ovnat	Jordan Valley	Neighborhood granted settlement status
16	22/03/2025	Ibei Hanahal	Bethlehem	Neighborhood granted settlement status
17	22/03/2025	Alon	Jerusalem	Neighborhood granted settlement status
18	22/03/2025	Brosh	Jordan Valley	Neighborhood granted settlement status
19	22/03/2025	Gvaot	Bethlehem	Neighborhood granted settlement status
20	22/03/2025	Haresha	Ramallah	Neighborhood granted settlement status
21	22/03/2025	Tal Menasheh	Jenin	Neighborhood granted settlement status
22	22/03/2025	Kerem Reim	Ramallah	Neighborhood granted settlement status
23	22/03/2025	Leshem	Qalqiliya	Neighborhood granted settlement status
24	22/03/2025	Migron	Ramallah	Neighborhood granted settlement status
25	22/03/2025	Nofei Nehemia	Salfit	Neighborhood granted settlement status

#	Decision Date	Settlement Name	Area	Type
26	22/03/2025	Nerya	Ramallah	Neighborhood granted settlement status
27	22/03/2025	Shvut Rachel	Nablus	Neighborhood granted settlement status
28	18/05/2025	Ahiya	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
29	18/05/2025	El-Nave	Jenin	Legalization of an outpost
30	18/05/2025	Afeka	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
31	18/05/2025	Beit Horon North	Ramallah	New Settlement
32	18/05/2025	Gvionit	Jordan Valley	Legalization of an outpost
33	18/05/2025	Mt. Ibal	Nablus	New Settlement
34	18/05/2025	Havot Yair	Qalqiliya	Legalization of an outpost
35	18/05/2025	Homesh	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
36	18/05/2025	Yonadav	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
37	18/05/2025	Gadi Base	Jordan Valley	Legalization of an outpost
38	18/05/2025	Maoz Zvi	Jenin	Legalization of an outpost
39	18/05/2025	Ma'alot Halhul	Hebron	New Settlement
40	18/05/2025	Mitzpe Ziv	Hebron	New Settlement
41	18/05/2025	Nofei Prat	Jerusalem	Neighborhood granted settlement status
42	18/05/2025	Adei Ad	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
43	18/05/2025	Atarot Eder	Ramallah	New Settlement
44	18/05/2025	Ir Hatmarim	Jericho	Legalization of an outpost
45	18/05/2025	Inbar	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
46	18/05/2025	Kedem Arava	Jericho	Legalization of an outpost
47	18/05/2025	Rehavam	Nablus	New Settlement
48	18/05/2025	Sa-Nur	Nablus	New Settlement
49	18/05/2025	Tevez	Jordan Valley	Legalization of an outpost
50	11/12/2025	Allenby	Jericho	New Settlement
51	11/12/2025	Esh Kodesh	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
52	11/12/2025	Givat Harel	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost

#	Decision Date	Settlement Name	Area	Type
53	11/12/2025	Ganim	Jenin	New Settlement
54	11/12/2025	Har Bezeq	Tubas	Legalization of an outpost
55	11/12/2025	Tamoun	Tubas	New Settlement
56	11/12/2025	Yitav West	Jericho	Legalization of an outpost
57	11/12/2025	Yaar Al-Karen	Bethlehem	New Settlement
58	11/12/2025	Kadim	Jenin	New Settlement
59	11/12/2025	Kochav Hashahar North	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
60	11/12/2025	Mishol	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
61	11/12/2025	Nof Gilad	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
62	11/12/2025	Duran	Hebron	New Settlement
63	11/12/2025	Pnei Kedem	Hebron	Neighborhood granted settlement status
64	11/12/2025	Kida	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
65	11/12/2025	Rosh Ha'ayin East	Salfit	Legalization of an outpost
66	11/12/2025	Rehanit	Jenin	Legalization of an outpost
67	11/12/2025	Shdema	Bethlehem	Legalization of an outpost
68	11/12/2025	Shalem	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
69	25/03/2026	Alonei Shomron	Jenin	New Settlement
70	25/03/2026	Elisha	Jericho	New Settlement
71	25/03/2026	Beit Zoar	Jericho	New Settlement
72	25/03/2026	Gvaot Adolam	Bethlehem	Legalization of an outpost
73	25/03/2026	Gad Natan	Hebron	New Settlement
74	25/03/2026	Giborei David	Jordan Valley	Legalization of an outpost
75	25/03/2026	Daya	Jericho	Legalization of an outpost
76	25/03/2026	Zibda	Ramallah	New Settlement
77	25/03/2026	Hayuta	Jordan Valley	New Settlement
78	25/03/2026	Yishuv Hadaat	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
79	25/03/2026	Karmeit Yehuda	Hebron	New Settlement

#	Decision Date	Settlement Name	Area	Type
80	25/03/2026	Mevo Hashemesh	Jordan Valley	New Settlement
81	25/03/2026	Mevo Tirza	Jordan Valley	New Settlement
82	25/03/2026	Mevot Yehushua	Ramallah	New Settlement
83	25/03/2026	Meged	Hebron	New Settlement
84	25/03/2026	Maayanot	Jenin	New Settlement
85	25/03/2026	Maale Anav	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
86	25/03/2026	Maale Arugot	Bethlehem	New Settlement
87	25/03/2026	Mitzpe Darga	Bethlehem	New Settlement
88	25/03/2026	Mitzpe Yair	Hebron	Legalization of an outpost
89	25/03/2026	Masuot Har	Bethlehem	New Settlement
90	25/03/2026	Neot Harim	Ramallah	New Settlement
91	25/03/2026	Noa	Jenin	New Settlement
92	25/03/2026	Nofei Yam	Tul Karem	New Settlement
93	25/03/2026	Natuf	Ramallah	New Settlement
94	25/03/2026	Emek Dotan	Jenin	New Settlement
95	25/03/2026	Tze'elon	Salfit	Legalization of an outpost
96	25/03/2026	Tzuri	Jericho	New Settlement
97	25/03/2026	Tzofnat	Nablus	Legalization of an outpost
98	25/03/2026	Rum Gilboa	Jenin	New Settlement
99	25/03/2026	Ramataim Zofim	Ramallah	Legalization of an outpost
100	25/03/2026	Rashash	Jordan Valley	Legalization of an outpost
101	25/03/2026	Sheizaf	Bethlehem	Legalization of an outpost
102	25/03/2026	Taanach	Jenin	New Settlement



The Mt. Eival settlement, established in early 2026.

2. Legalization of outposts

In addition to the illegal outposts which the government plans to legalize as official settlements, procedures have begun to regularize six other outposts as neighborhoods within existing settlements: Netiv HaAvot, Nof Harim, HaYovel, Plagei Mayim, Givat Hanan, and Bnei Adam.

The first five outposts are being regularized through the advancement of planning schemes, enabling their legalization. In December 2025, the head of Central Command added the Bnei Adam outpost to Adam's jurisdiction, allowing for a planning scheme for legalization. Another example: plans exist to incorporate the Beit Eliyahu outpost, near the ArieH military base in the al-Jiftlik area, into the Jordan Valley Regional Council's jurisdiction.

2.1 A workaround to legalization

Alongside the legalization of outposts through government decisions and the advancement of planning procedures, the government, in a February 2023 cabinet resolution, decided to establish a “[bypass legalization](#)” track for outposts. Under this decision, the government designates a list of outposts as “sites in the process of regularization,” which, although illegal, receive government funding and services and are effectively shielded from law enforcement, including the demolition of illegal construction.

In May 2024, a list of [70 outposts](#) that Minister Smotrich had instructed be funded and developed was made public, even though they are illegal, and although nearly all of them are centers of settler violence.


3. Planning: Approval of More Than 40,000 Housing Units in Settlements

In June 2023, the government [eliminated](#) the requirement for the [defense minister’s approval](#) to advance settlement plans. In November 2024, it decided to allow the Higher Planning Council to convene weekly to approve settlement plans, instead of four times a year, as had been the practice in recent years.

At the same time, Minister Smotrich instructed the professional staff of the Civil Administration to launch an accelerated planning push and approve as many settlement construction plans as possible. Once approved, these plans can be used for future construction even if subsequent governments decide to halt settlement planning.



During the three years of the current government, plans were advanced to construct 40,064 new housing units in settlements, laying the groundwork for the future growth of 160,000 to 200,000 settlers.

Advancement of Construction in Settlements, by Year Updated: 5/11/25 · Source: Publications of the Higher Planning Council – Count by Peace Now



It should be noted that each plan goes through two main stages of approval: deposit approval and final approval. The annual chart shows the total number of housing units approved each year, either for deposit or for final approval.

The calculation of the total number of plans advanced over the past three years does not double-count the same plan (if it received both approval for deposit and final approval during this period). Accordingly, the total number of housing units advanced over the past three years stands at 40,064.



3.1 Approval of plans in E1

In August 2025, the [Higher Planning Council gave final approval](#) to plans for 3,401 housing units in [E1](#). For years, governments had refrained from advancing these plans under international pressure. The Netanyahu–Smotrich government chose to move them forward despite their widely recognized [severe implications](#) for the prospects of a future two-state agreement.

E1 lies at the heart of the West Bank, and building settlements there would further divide the territory and prevent the development of a Palestinian metropolitan area between Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Bethlehem.

3.2 “Fabric of Life” road (the “apartheid road”)

Alongside the advancement of building plans in E1, the government decided in March 2025 to allocate [335 million shekels](#) to construct a road for Palestinians between al-Eizariya and az-Za’ayyem. The road, which Naftali Bennett called the “[sovereignty road](#),” is meant to divert all Palestinian traffic traveling between the northern and southern West Bank away from the Ma’ale Adumim area onto a separate road designated for Palestinian use only.

The rationale behind the new road is to enable the [closure of the Ma’ale Adumim area](#)—about 3 percent of the West Bank—to Palestinians. Excluding Palestinians from the current access road to Ma’ale Adumim would allow Israel to connect Ma’ale Adumim and E1 to Jerusalem without barriers and checkpoints, effectively incorporating them into the State of Israel.


4. Tenders

During its three years in office, the Netanyahu–Smotrich government issued tenders for the construction of 12,216 housing units in settlements, [setting a record](#) for the number of tenders published. The publication of a tender marks the [implementation stage](#) of settlement construction. Once the building plans have been approved, the Housing Ministry issues a tender inviting contractors to submit bids to purchase building rights and market the housing units.

Not all settlements use tenders for new construction, however, and in some projects the settlement itself selects the contractors who carry out the building.

Tenders Published in Settlements, by Year

Source: Publications of the Ministry of Construction – Count by Peace Now



Construction site in Ofarim settlement.

5. Intercity roads

. At an internal conference of the Religious Zionism party, a recording of which was [exposed by Peace Now](#), Minister Smotrich said he had allocated 7 billion shekels for roads in the settlements over the next five years—an enormous sum of about 1.4 billion shekels per year. For comparison, the budget for intercity roads across all of Israel over the past four years has been about 4.5 billion shekels annually (according to budget execution data for the intercity roads line item).

According to an analysis by Peace Now, the planned roads in the West Bank are intended to serve only about 300,000 settlers. Taken together, these billions amount to roughly 30 percent of Israel's intercity roads budget. Roads are key to settlement development: past experience shows that once a bypass road is built, the number of settlers in the settlements along it [grows rapidly](#).

Roads under construction or nearing the start of construction

Road Infrastructure Budgets and Investments Amounts are stated in NIS millions. Dash indicates data not provided.

Road Number	Road Name	Region	Estimated Budget (NIS millions)	Investment through 2024 (NIS millions)*
45	The Quarries Road	Ramallah	361	2.7
45	Qalandiya Interchange	Ramallah	120	113.4
—	Al-Eizariya–Al-Za'im	Jerusalem	335	
—	Eastern Ring Road	Jerusalem	1,300	323
60	Sha'ar Binyamin–British Police Junction	Ramallah	1,000	0.9
60	Jerusalem–Bani Na'im	Bethlehem & Hebron	1,233	1,155
55	Funduq Bypass Road	Qalqilya	200	-
55	Nursery Road	Qalqilya	128	48.5
505	Ariel–Tapuach Junction	Nablus	500	6.6
446	Modi'in Illit–Shilat	Ramallah	260 + 47	64
465	Luban Bypass Road	Ramallah	120	250
437	Hizma–Adam	Ramallah	160	19.217
375	Beitar Illit–Husan	Bethlehem	111	
Total			5,764	1,983

Expenditure data through 2024 are based on the Ministry of Finance's budget execution reports and the Ministry of Transportation budget line items. Additional costs may have been incurred.

Roads in planning and pre-construction

Road Number	Road Name	Region	Status
454	Dolev-Road 443	Ramallah	Detailed planning for implementation
4431	Modi'in Illit-443	Ramallah	Statutory planning
45	Atarot Interchange	Ramallah	Detailed planning for implementation
1	Issawiya Interchange	Jerusalem	Detailed planning for implementation
3742	Beitar Illit-Gva'ot	Bethlehem	Statutory planning; objections submitted
60	From the British Police Junction to Tapuach Junction	Nablus	Statutory planning
60	From Bani Na'im to Shama	Hebron	Statutory planning
367	Kfar Etzion-Jaba'	Bethlehem	Approved
446	Beit El-Road 60	Ramallah	Road expansion and upgrade; approved
90	Jordan Valley Road	Jordan Valley	Statutory planning
60	Silat al-Dahr Bypass Road	Jenin	Seizure order issued



Construction work on the al-Funduq bypass road.

6. Hebron

From early 2023 through February 2026, the number of new settlement sites in Hebron has increased sharply, along with the spread of settlers across the city. During this period, [seven new settlement sites were](#) established within [Palestinian neighborhoods](#). At least two are [deep inside Palestinian areas](#), far from the center of the Jewish settlement in the city.

In 2025, Israel decided to alter the religious status quo in Hebron, and the head of the Civil Administration signed an [expropriation order](#) for an area within the Cave of the Patriarchs. The order applies to approximately 288 square meters of roofing over the open inner courtyard on the upper (prayer) level. This move is intended to allow Israel to carry out physical changes to the historic structure without coordination with the Palestinians, in violation of the Hebron Agreement and international law.

On February 8, 2026, [the cabinet decided](#) to strip the Hebron Municipality of its planning and building authority over the Cave of the Patriarchs and the settlement area in the city. This decision enables Israel to unilaterally approve building plans and make changes at the holy site, a clear violation of the Hebron Agreement signed in 1997.

Alongside the takeover of individual homes, [a plan is advancing](#) to establish a large settlement adjacent to Hebron, known as “Givat Mevasser.” The settlement, officially classified as a “neighborhood” of Kiryat Arba, is planned to be located about 800 meters north of Givat HaHarsina, the northern part of Kiryat Arba. It lies in the heart of a Palestinian residential area, near the village of Beit Einun. The new settlement is connected to Kiryat Arba by a long, winding road and has no territorial contiguity with other settlements. At the end of 2025, a new outpost was also established east of Givat Mevasser.




Gaon Yehuda neighborhood near Tel Rumeida, where settlers moved in during 2025.

D. Lands


1. Declaration of state land

Between 2023 and 2025, the government declared [25,959 dunams](#) as state land in the West Bank—nearly half of all land declared as state land [since the beginning of the Oslo process](#). [The declaration of state land](#) has been the primary method Israel has used to take over land in the West Bank and transfer it to settlers. To date, the Civil Administration has declared about 824,000 dunams in Area C as state land, amounting to roughly 14.5 percent of the West Bank.



List of the declarations of state land in the past three years

22/11/2023	501.00	Jaba'	Expansion of the settlement of Geva Binyamin and legalization of the outpost Bnei Adam
29/2/2024	2,640.30	Abu Dis, al-Eizariya	Creating territorial continuity between the settlements of Ma'ale Adumim and Kedar
21/3/2024	8,159.80	Aqraba	Takeover of land between the settlements of Ma'ale Efraim, Yafit, and Mesua
1/4/2024	170.94	Arab al-Ta'amra	Herodion archaeological site
25/6/2024	12,715.20	Aqraba	Takeover of land between the settlements of Ma'ale Efraim, Yafit, and Mesua (Phases B and C)
08/7/2024	65.69	Beita, Qabalan	Legalization of the unauthorized outpost Evyatar
15/7/2024	441.14	Shibtin, Deir Qadis, Deir Ammar	Expansion of the areas of the settlements of Nili & Na'ale
17/11/2024	10.37	Burin	Legalization of the cemetery of the settlement of Yitzhar
9/12/2024	54.79	Qatana, Bidu	Expansion of the area of the settlement of Har Adar
11/6/2025	750.00	al-Mughayyir	Legalization of the outpost Malachei HaShalom and the establishment of a settlement in the area
1/9/2025	455.58	Jit, Far'ata, Tal	Legalization of some of the structures in the outpost of Havat Gilad



Map attached to the state land declaration order intended to legalize structures in the Havat Gilad outpost.

2. Expropriations

In the three years since the government took office, Israel has expropriated 964 dunams in the West Bank. In November 2025, it also announced plans to [expropriate about 2,000 dunams](#) for the development of the archaeological site at Sebastia. The expropriation was carried out in February 2026. By comparison, between 2020 and 2022, the state expropriated 1,356 dunams. In addition, Israel announced the implementation of a series of earlier expropriations to expand existing roads, totaling an additional 857 dunams.

Land expropriations are conducted under the Order Concerning Land Law (Acquisition for Public Purposes) (Judea and Samaria) No. 321, 1969. Under international law and Israeli

case law, Israel is prohibited from expropriating land if the expropriation is intended solely for settlers' use. Expropriation is permitted only if it also serves the Palestinian population. However, in practice, [nearly half](#) of the land expropriated by Israel over the years has been intended to serve only settlers' needs.

Expropriation orders for public purposes, 2023–Early 2026

Date	Order Number	Purpose of the Expropriation	Area (dunams)	Village Lands	Type
04/01/2023	H/1/23	Expansion of Road 437 in the Adam–Hizma section	225.395	Jaba', Hizma, Beit Hanina	New expropriation
20/02/2023	H/2/23	Preservation and protection of the Archelais archaeological site	139.292	'Auja	New expropriation
29/03/2023	H/2/98	Construction of a traffic circle in the "Knee Curve" section	0.968	al-Khadr	Implementation of a previous expropriation
18/05/2023	H/3/23	Peduel Interchange on Road 5 ("Trans-Samaria Road")	42.651	Sarta, Bruqin	New expropriation
18/10/2023	H/1/83 and others	Implementation of expropriation for Road 437, Adam–Sha'ar Binyamin section	76.204	Jaba'	Implementation of a previous expropriation
23/05/2024	H/7/90 and others	Implementation of expropriation for the expansion of Road 60, Halhul–Bani Na'im	385.404	Halhul, Sa'ir, Hebron	Implementation of a previous expropriation
24/07/2024	H/3/24	Road 60 expansion and regulation from the British Police Junction to the Binyamin industrial zone	66.671	Silwad, Ein Yabrud, al-Bireh, Beitin, Deir Dibwan, Burqa, Mikhmas	New expropriation
13/10/2024	H/4/24	Road 505 expansion and regulation from Ariel Junction to Tapuach Junction	166.742	Kifl Haris, Marda, Jamma'in, Huwwara, Yasuf	New expropriation

Date	Order Number	Purpose of the Expropriation	Area (dunams)	Village Lands	Type
13/10/2024	H/4/77 and others	Implementation of expropriations for Road 505 expansion and regulation from Ariel Junction to Tapuach Junction	379.259	Kifl Haris, Marda, Jamma'in, Huwwara, Yasuf	Implementation of a previous expropriation
18/11/2024	H/2/24	Road 55, Alfei Menashe–West Bank boundary	47.300	Habla	New expropriation
18/11/2024	H/2/81	Road 55, Alfei Menashe–West Bank boundary	15.700	Habla	Implementation of a previous expropriation
26/12/2024	H/5/24	Road 45 (HaMachatzavot Road)	275.594	Jaba', Kafr 'Aqab	New expropriation
26/12/2024	H/1/83	Road 45 (HaMachatzavot Road)	4.694	Mikhmas, Jaba'	Implementation of a previous expropriation
15/09/2025	H/1/25	Roofing of the inner courtyard of the Cave of the Patriarchs	0.288	Hebron	New expropriation
11/02/2026	H/1/26	Sebastia archaeological site	2,068.100	Sebastia, Burqa	New expropriation

3. Seizure orders

Between 2023 and 2025, the military issued at least 140 seizure orders, under which about 3,370 dunams were seized. Seizure orders are ostensibly temporary, and the land they cover may, in principle, be used only for security purposes. As shown below, however, the concept of “security needs” is subordinated first and foremost to the interests of the settlement enterprise.

Seizure orders for “security purposes,” 2023–2025

Year	Number of seizure orders	Purpose of the Expropriation
2023	25	450
2024	32	300
2025	83	2,620


Of the orders reviewed, 113 (about 81 percent) were issued to protect settlements and illegal outposts, build roads to them, or retroactively legalize unauthorized roads leading to these areas.

Eighteen seizure orders were issued for clearly military purposes, such as the expansion of military bases and the construction of roads to border areas. Nine orders, covering approximately 1,160 dunams, were intended for the construction of the “[Hut Ha-Shanee Barrier](#)” in the northern Jordan Valley to further isolate the Jordan Valley from the rest of the West Bank.

While settlers may benefit from this project, as the barrier could allow them to take over tens of thousands of dunams to the east, we present these orders separately from those issued specifically for settlement and outpost residents.

On March 4, 2026, work began on one section of the “Second String Barrier,” after the court accepted the state’s position that the work was urgently required due to the war with Iran. It also lifted the interim injunction issued on January 25, 2026, which had prohibited the work “unless an urgent security need exists” (HCJ 69530-01-26 Tubas Municipality v. IDF Commander in the West Bank).

Land Area Seized, by Purpose, 2023-2025




Most of the land seized by the military falls under orders intended to serve settlers' needs. The total area covered by these orders is 2,050 dunams, about 60 percent of the total. The second-largest category by area is the nine orders intended for the construction of the barrier in the northern Jordan Valley, covering 1,160 dunams, or about 34 percent of the total. The remaining 160 dunams are covered by orders intended for the military's own purposes.

Alongside these seizure orders, the head of Central Command also signed dozens of "orders for the implementation of security measures" ("clearing orders"). We do not have a complete mapping of these orders, but we estimate that their cumulative scope totals thousands of dunams.

These orders stipulate that, for security reasons, agricultural crops in the designated areas must be uprooted. Through this mechanism, the IDF has uprooted tens of thousands of fruit trees, the vast majority of them olive trees.

One of the largest orders is [Order](#) 25/25 (signed in August 2025), which ordered the uprooting of crops on about 300 dunams of land belonging to the village of al-Mughayyir, southeast of Nablus.

The order was issued as punishment after a Palestinian shot and wounded a settler who had trespassed on the village's land. Settlers from the Shiloh area carried out clearing operations on [about 620 dunams](#)—more than twice the area covered by the order. After the uprooting, settlers began taking over parts of the land.



Map of Order for Taking Measures No. 25/25, on the lands of the village of al-Mughayyir

Alongside these measures, the IDF demolished dozens of homes in the Jenin and Nur al-Shams refugee camps after ordering residents to evacuate in early 2025. These demolitions were carried out on the grounds of “clear security needs” and through [orders](#) giving 24 hours’ notice. In this operation, the IDF forcibly displaced [tens of thousands of residents](#), who remain barred from returning to their homes more than a year later.

4. Jurisdictional areas

In the past three years, the government has revised the jurisdictional boundaries of 113 settlements, including the establishment of areas for 43 new settlements. Other changes include both expansions and reductions of existing settlement boundaries.

A total of 21,146 dunams were added to settlement jurisdictions. These areas, formally designated as closed military zones that bar Palestinian entry, are now available for settlement planning and construction. Municipal authority in these areas rests with the local authority of the respective settlement.

Of the 43 new settlements assigned jurisdictional areas, 19 are outposts undergoing legalization, 13 are neighborhoods reclassified as independent settlements, and 11 are entirely new settlements.

In 23 cases, areas were separated from existing settlements to form new ones. In 22 cases, the areas were newly designated and had not previously been part of any settlement.

Additionally, about [7,200 dunams](#) of Area C land, closed to Israeli entry after the disengagement in the [Homesh and Sa-Nur area](#), [were added](#) to the Samaria Regional Council's jurisdiction but not assigned to any specific settlement. In November 2023, approximately [206 dunams](#) were added to the Jordan Valley Regional Council in the al-Jiftlik area.

Changes to the jurisdiction areas of settlements

Year	Settlement	Total Jurisdiction Area Declared (dunams)	Type	Carved Out From	Notes
2023	Tel Zion	777.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Kochav Yaakov	
2023	Avigayil	200.000	Outpost legalization	New	
2023	Beit Hogla	1,044.000	Outpost legalization	Beit HaArava	Declared over 4,067 dunams; in 2025, an area was removed for Kedem Arava
2023	Asa'el	864.000	Outpost legalization	New	
2023	Givat HaRo'eh	463.000	Outpost legalization	New	A small part of the area was within the jurisdiction of Ma'ale Levona
2023	Shaharit	452.000	Outpost legalization	New	
2024	Mishmar Yehuda	417.000	New settlement	New	A small part was previously within the jurisdiction of Kedar
2024	Nahal Heletz	119.000	Outpost legalization	New	The jurisdiction area does not include the outpost area itself
2025	Adorayim	130.000	Outpost legalization	New	The jurisdiction area does not include the outpost area itself
2025	Maoz Zvi	1,439.000	Outpost legalization	Mevo Dotan	
2025	Havat Ya'ir	477.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Yakir	In 2026, the settlement was renamed Lehi
2025	Shvut Rachel	895.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Shilo	
2025	Adei Ad	1,463.000	Outpost legalization	Amihai	
2025	Ahiya	1,079.000	Outpost legalization	New	

Year	Settlement	Total Jurisdiction Area Declared (dunams)	Type	Carved Out From	Notes
2025	Gedi	790.000	Outpost legalization	Mesua	
2025	Bataron	941.000	Outpost legalization	New	Named "Giv'onit" in the government decision
2025	Tal Menashe	2,940.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Hinanit	
2025	Harasha	581.000	Outpost legalization	New	
2025	Nofei Prat	1,153.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Kfar Adumim	
2025	Migron	62.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Kochav Yaakov	
2025	Ir HaTmarim	906.000	New settlement	Mevo'ot Yericho	
2025	Sa-Nur	59.000	New settlement	New	
2025	Goder (Tavetz)	412.000	New settlement	New	
2025	Leshem	463.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Alei Zahav	
2025	Neria	2,079.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Talmon	
2025	Kerem Re'im	611.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Talmon	
2025	Parashim (El Naveh)	2,402.000	Outpost legalization	Hermesh	
2025	Ibei HaNahal	1,326.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Ma'ale Amos	
2025	Havat Gilad	154.000	Outpost legalization	New	
2025	Avnat	246.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Mitzpe Shalem and Kalia	
2025	Kedem Arava	3,023.000	Outpost legalization	Beit Hogla	Carved out from the area of Beit Hogla, declared in 2023

Year	Settlement	Total Jurisdiction Area Declared (dunams)	Type	Carved Out From	Notes
2025	Har Eival	663.000	New settlement	New	
2025	Yondav	994.000	New settlement	Shima	
2025	Yitav Ma'arav	205.000	New settlement	New	
2025	Gva'ot	2,076.000	Neighborhood granted settlement status	Alon Shvut	
2025	Homesh	800.000	New settlement	New	
2026	Yatziv (Shdema)	92.690	Outpost legalization	New	
2026	Kanfei HaShahar	1,569.786	New settlement	New	
2026	Brosh HaBika'a	1,441.333	Neighborhood granted settlement status	New	
2026	Ganim	2,790.560	New settlement	New	
2026	Kadim	1,464.678	New settlement	New	
2026	Mitzukei Eretz	400.321	Outpost legalization	New	
2026	Mitzpe Zif	155	Outpost legalization	Pnei Hever	The jurisdiction area does not include the outpost area itself

5. Reduction of Firing Zones to Enable Settlement Expansion

On September 16, 2025, the head of Central Command signed a series of orders amending the boundaries of several firing zones in the West Bank.

“Firing zones” are closed military areas where entry is officially prohibited for all civilians (Israelis and Palestinians alike), except for “permanent residents” living in the area. However, Israel refuses to recognize all Palestinians living in these areas as permanent residents.

Despite these restrictions, settlers have taken control of hundreds of thousands of dunams within firing zones over the past two decades, particularly in the last decade. This has occurred mainly through the establishment of farm outposts near or within these areas.

Settlers have taken over these areas so easily, largely because the military has not used most of the land for decades. In effect, it's a [fiction](#): this policy enables the military to [prevent Palestinians from entering and, let alone residing](#) in these areas, which cover more than 960,000 dunams, or about 17 percent of the West Bank.

Over the years, the military has changed the map of [firing zones in](#) the West Bank: a few zones were [canceled](#), while others were redefined to align with settlers' or the Civil Administration's needs. The most recent changes, signed by Central Command head Avi Bluth, are not the first time the military has redefined firing zones to serve settler interests. These latest changes were carried out in a highly selective and carefully calibrated manner, revealing their purpose.

In total, the boundaries of nine firing zones were changed, along with an additional closed military area in the al-Jiftlik region that is not designated as a firing zone. To our knowledge, the closure order for this area has never been enforced.


These changes removed about 6,350 dunams from the total area designated as firing zones. At the same time, approximately 380 dunams were added to Firing Zone 904 in the area of Camp Arie, also in the al-Jiftlik region.

An examination of the areas removed from the firing zones shows that decision-makers had three objectives in mind:

- a. Expanding existing settlements
- b. Legalizing outposts, or parts of settlements
- c. Creating conditions for the establishment of outposts and settlements in the future

Areas Excluded from the Firing Zone

Firing Zone / Closed Military Area	Purpose	Area Excluded / Added (Dunams)
929 + 959	Establishment of the Adorayim settlement	91
Jiftlik	Exclusion of the agricultural compound of the Mishoa Settlement from the firing zone and its transfer to the settlement's jurisdiction	137
904A	Legalization of the Giv'at Arnon Outpost	631
903	Legalization of the Menahem Goshen Farm Outpost and expansion of the Hemdat Settlement	214
203	Legalization of the Hesed Olam Farm Outpost	709
203	Exclusion of the Beit Aryeh Checkpoint	30
904	Expansion of the Ma'ale Efraim Industrial Zone	192
904	Establishment of a settlement (previously, there was a plan to establish a settlement there called Shlomtzion, which was not implemented)	1,950
906	Legalization of the Mitzpe Kramim Outpost	115
900	Expansion of the Giv'at Sela'it Outpost and legalization of the Shirat Ha'asavim Outpost	439
902	Expansion of the Maskiyot Settlement	1,837
203	Expansion of the Hanson Nahal Rabah Quarry	93



The map signed by Major General Bluth amending the boundaries of the closed military area in the al-Jiftlik region

Conclusion

More than three years have passed since Netanyahu's sixth government took office—the most corrupt, racist, and violent of all its predecessors.

During these years, the reality in the West Bank has deteriorated at an unprecedented pace due to government decisions and the appointment of individuals to key positions in the government, the Civil Administration, and the military.

Between 2023 and 2025, Israeli policy in the West Bank shifted from gradual expansion to institutionalized acceleration.

This is not just about additional settlement construction, but a systematic transformation of the control regime: the civilianization of powers, their transfer to settlers, broad government funding, the authorization of outposts, the expulsion of communities, land seizure, the opening of infrastructure routes, and the deepening of control even in areas under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction.

Taken together, these measures are creating a reality of de facto annexation, while systematically dismantling Palestinian space and the possibility of a future political agreement based on partition into two states.

The unprecedented changes reviewed here took place alongside two major developments that have shaped recent years.

The first is the judicial overhaul, which the settler right has been among the most aggressive proponents of, in the hope that its completion would enable annexation measures in the West Bank through the legal and constitutional changes the right seeks to advance.

The second is the war that broke out on October 7, 2023, and has continued ever since at varying levels of intensity and in changing forms.

The combination of an unrestrained government led by a man standing trial over serious personal corruption allegations, murderous violence on a scale previously unseen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and American administrations that were either weak (Biden) or friendly toward the far right (Trump), enabled Israel's 35th government during this period to establish nearly 200 outposts and settlements and declare its intention to establish dozens more in the near future.

The establishment of outposts and settlements brought a wave of violence against the Palestinian population, led by settlers assisted by regular military forces and quasi-militia units (regional defense units, Hagamar) stationed in the West Bank. This violence translated into the ethnic cleansing of over one million dunams, including the expulsion of at least 118 communities and shepherding clusters across the West Bank.

On February 9, 2026, a man named Moshe Sharvit, who established the Tirzah Valley Farm outpost and has been, and remains, involved in some of the most violent attacks against Palestinian farmers, appeared on Shimon Riklin's program on Channel 14.

Sharvit, who came to the studio as a representative of a body called the "Farm Union," was asked during the brief interview: "Does the dream also include expelling the Arabs who live there?" Sharvit replied: "We are engaged in cleaning the area and operating in every open area possible." The collaboration between people like Sharvit and the current Israeli government has never been more explicit.