The Wild West

Grazing, seizing and looting by Israeli settlers in the West Bank
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May 2022

In memory of Meron Benvenisti (1934-2020) member of Kerem Navot's board of directors

English translation: Ami Asher

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Construction takes up little ground, due to economic considerations of building development, which is costly, and thus we have arrived at 100 square kilometers after fifty, slightly more than fifty years... the shepherd farms, over the last three years we have ventured into the large expanse, [so that] they now cover an area almost twice as large as the built area of the settlements.

Ze’ev Hever – Secretary General, Amana¹

Introduction

On August 16, 1976, a news item in the leading Hebrew daily Maariv bore the title “Gandhi will testify in favor of members of a West Bank settlement who have killed an Arab thief”. “Gandhi” was the (deliberately oxymoronic) nickname of Major General (res.) Rehavam Ze’evi, who had served as Commander of Central Command from 1968-1973. In order to understand the context of the event that led Gandhi, who was to become one of the most extreme right-wing politicians in Israel, to testify in favor of the Israeli settlers, we need to go back a few years.

The settlement in question, Mevo Horon, was established in early 1969 on the lands of Beit Nuba, a Palestinian village whose inhabitants (together with those of the neighboring Imwas and Yalu) had been expelled by Israel from the Latrun Salient about eighteen months previously – shortly after the occupation of the West Bank in the 1967 war. Several months after these three villages had been depopulated, the entire salient was declared a closed military area (Closed Military Area J). A large section of this area, measuring a total of nearly 4,000 acres, was transferred in the early 1970s to the Jewish National Fund (JNF), on which what is now known as the Ayalon Canada Park was established. Another section was eventually used to build parts of Highway 1 and the fast railway line between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.²

¹ This statement was made in Amana’s conference on February 21, 2021, titled “The Battle for State Lands”.
² For further details, see Kerem Navot’s report, “A Locked Garden: Declaration of Closed Areas in the West Bank/ March 2015”, p. 36.
Given the large size of this territory, which became a frontier area bordering to the east on several Palestinian villages, the question was asked, how could the uprooted Palestinians be prevented from returning to their lands? In other words, how could the Israeli claim be strengthened, and facts on the ground created? The establishment of Mevo Horon was a partial attempt to deal with these questions, but it was far from optimal. A much more comprehensive solution had to be found, and it was.

In early 1971, some 5,400 acres were transferred to the newly established settlement, to be used as grazing areas for a herd of cattle bought for it. This area straddled both sides of the Green Line, including the no-man’s land of the 1948-67 interwar period. These events were documented in an extensive correspondence between the settlement and the Ministry of Agriculture officials, already in the early 1970s. In 1981, Mevo Horon’s Economic Coordinator Yigal Grenvitz wrote to the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Michael Dekel, after some of the grazing areas allocated to the settlement about a decade earlier were taken away from it over the years for various purposes; the settlers wanted to prevent the expropriation of additional areas:

> When we settled here some twelve years ago, the settlement authorities viewed the rolling hills in our area, the Ayalon Valley, as having serious potential as means of production for our economy and therefore some 5,400 acres of rocky ground were earmarked for us as grazing lands. Over the years, we have invested a fortune of the Jewish People’s money in fencing, buying cows, cowsheds, facilities, roads and other equipment in order to turn these lands into a lucrative industry.

The campaign of the Mevo Horon settlers was successful, and they managed to keep an area of land sufficient for a large herd of cattle. More than five decades later, the settlement still controls a large cow grazing area, some of it within the Canada Park.

In 2004, the Separation Barrier was erected east of Mevo Horon, thereby cutting it off from the rest of the West Bank. As we shall see below, this method of taking over large open lands by allocating them as grazing areas for settlers has also been used elsewhere in the West Bank – in areas where, absent the fog of war, it would prove much more difficult to uproot the Palestinians.

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3. This was a strip of some 11,000 acres stretched along the borderline, demilitarized according to the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel. After 1967, Israel annexed this area.

4. Israel State Archives (hereafter, ISA), Mevo Horon File, 6886/10-ג (Hebrew (hereafter, H)).

5. ISA, Mevo Horon File, 6886/10-ג (H).
Letter by Mevo Horon’s Economy Coordinator to Deputy Minister of Agriculture regarding lands allocated to the settlement, September 27, 1981
Objectives

This report describes and analyzes the development of Israeli sheep and cattle grazing in the West Bank, which has gradually become Israel’s most significant mechanism for dispossessing Palestinian communities. At issue are tens of thousands of acres of open areas expropriated by the Israeli authorities and settlers through dozens of shepherd outposts and farms, the great majority of which have been established over the past decade. As noted above, the use of grazing to seize land began in the early 1970s and it continued intermittently in the 1980s and 90s. In recent years, however, the phenomenon mushroomed in terms of area size, resources invested and destructive repercussions for the Palestinian communities.

The declared objective of the farm outposts is to “protect state lands”\(^6\). In practice, however, they are designed to uproot Palestinian grazing and farming communities, whether on public or private lands, and turn them into lands that only settlers can use. To promote this objective, one instrument must be used above all others: violence. Indeed, the farm outposts have recently seen some of the most violent incidents in the West Bank. It is no wonder that the uprooting of people from their lands, often also their ancestral lands, requires severe and ongoing violence. Accordingly, countless incidents involving threats, harassment and assaults on Palestinian farmers and shepherds have been occurring around these outposts in recent years, often in the presence and even with the full support of military or police forces.

Most outposts are also used for the employment of the youth, including those deemed at risk. Employment in these farms is seen by the regional authorities as having “rehabilitative” potential, recruiting youth who are considered to have strayed off the straight and narrow to serve the collective cause. However, behind this “rehabilitation” rationale also hides a very simple and prosaic concern: the need for an available, cheap, and violent work force able and willing to take part in the daily “action” that life on the frontier entails.

This document calls for further research. It does not pretend to exhaust the discussion, among other things because it does not describe the full scope of the destructive repercussions of the shepherd outposts and farms for the living fabric of the Palestinian communities – some in Area C and some in areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) – whose lands are grabbed and livelihoods robbed. The conclusion that does nevertheless clearly emerge from observations on the ground is that more and more Palestinian shepherds are being forced to reduce the size of their flocks or even sell them completely, since their grazing areas have been reduced, sometimes drastically. This reduction requires them to purchase more grain fodder, which has been getting more expensive mainly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (together, these two countries produce about a third of the global wheat consumption). The economic difficulties are compounded by increasing restrictions on any Palestinian construction in Area C, which conjointly create a coercive environment for the Palestinians residing in the area, particularly

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\(^6\) The use of the term “state lands” throughout this document does not imply any recognition of these lands on which the State of Israel has any legal claim. Rather, these are public lands, which, instead of being preserved for the use of the Palestinian public as required by international law, Israel has used at will, and transferred to various state and quasi-state entities promoting the settlement project.
the shepherds whose livelihood depends on their ability to move freely within a given space. The result is the dwindling and impoverishment of the Palestinian shepherd communities in Area C. For more information on the implications of the Israeli shepherd outposts and farms for the Palestinian population, see the report published by B’Tselem in November 2021 – “State Business: Israel’s Misappropriation of Land in the West Bank through settler Violence” – with several testimonies by Palestinians living near outposts.

Methodology

This report is based on fieldwork conducted over the last few years, with two aims in mind. The first is relatively straightforward: mapping the farm outposts, most of which remain in place, with only a negligible number being occasionally established and evacuated by the military. It should be noted that this project does not map all the outposts in the West Bank, but only those relevant for the phenomenon of justification of grazing needs for land grabbing. The second aim is far more complex: mapping the areas under settler control, including areas where access for Palestinian farmers and shepherds has become extremely dangerous due to the establishment of shepherd outposts. In this regard, two important points must be highlighted and refined:

1. The reality on the ground is dynamic: an area that used to be safe for grazing can quickly become dangerous for or even completely closed to Palestinian access. The opposite is also true, only much less frequent. The reason why the boundaries of the areas in question are not completely static has to do primarily with the seasonal nature of grazing: in many places, the settlers seize lower and warmer grazing areas in the winter months when the pastures are greenest, and in the summer months, they ascend to higher and cooler areas where grass still remains. Accordingly, the boundaries of the areas denied to Palestinian shepherds might vary during the year.

2. This project does not map all the extensive areas closed to Palestinians in the West Bank, and particularly the settlement areas, but only those grazing and farming areas that have become inaccessible due to the establishment of farm outposts. It should however not be forgotten that the total areas closed to Palestinians in the West Bank are much more extensive than those that are mapped here.
Information Sources

The mapping of areas seized by settlers is informed by three sources:

1. Interviews with Palestinian shepherds and the volunteers who accompany them in different areas over time.

2. Field observations of the grazing areas of both settlers and Palestinians.

3. Aerial photographs that can be used to mark terrain features such as deep valleys and roads often used as the de-facto boundaries between areas appropriated by settlers and those (still) available to Palestinian grazing.

“I’d like to suspend the evacuation of the farm”: Illegality as Intrinsic to the Project

Settler: Who are you?

We: Travelers

Settler: Before entering an area, it is customary to ask the landowner’s permission

We: Who are you?

Settler: I’m the reason why you don’t see any Arabs here

Random conversation with an Israeli shepherd from Nahliel on the lands of the Palestinian village of Mazra’a al-Qibliya

As is true of all outposts established in the past three decades, the dozens of shepherd outposts have been established in violation of international, as well as Israeli law. Indeed, none of the constructions in the outposts comply with Israeli law, and in many cases the outpost residents are involved in grabbing lands that even Israeli authorities recognize as owned by Palestinians. Whether these are public or private lands, these takeovers involve severe and ongoing violence against Palestinian shepherds and farmers, often directed also at Israeli and international activists who help the Palestinians access their lands. Thus, this chapter in the history of the settlement project is once again intrinsically related to the systemic failure to enforce the law over Israelis in the West Bank. As we have often written in the past, this lack of enforcement is not a matter of specific “mishap”, but is a deliberate omission. It is essential to the settlement project and is guided by a clear and firm rationale, that the state stands behind it – by default, and as described below, by action.
An example of the political system collaboration with the outlaw outposts was published in February 2020 in Haaretz — a letter written by Avi Roe, Advisor to the Minister of Defense on Settlement Matters. Roe, who had previously served as the Head of the Binyamin Regional Council in the West Bank and was deeply involved in illegal construction and takeover of private Palestinian lands, appealed to an officer in the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) to prevent the evacuation of a shepherd outpost established only a few months beforehand, about a mile south of the Kedar settlement. Following Roe’s request, which was probably coordinated with Benjamin Netanyahu, who was then both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, the outpost was not evacuated, and it stands to this day, even though demolition warrants are still pending against all the buildings within it.

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7. C. Levinson, “Attorney General Closed Files of Construction Offenses in the Territories, Because the State Had Not Enforced This Issue to This Day”, Haaretz, March 30, 2017 (H).
Violence as Intrinsic to Dispossession

Moshe said: I don't want to see you with my eyes.

Testimony of a Palestinian shepherd in the northern Jordan Valley

Saturday, March 13, 2021, was a late-winter sunny day in the southern Hebron Hills. On this day, the parents of the Al-‘Alian family made a decision that soon proved to be a terrible mistake: they decided to travel with their children to their lands, located not far from an illegal outpost which had been established in the late 1990s, subsequently named Mitzpe Yair. Shortly after their arrival, some fifteen settlers ran down from the outpost. Struggling to speak with his broken jaw, this is how the father Said described what happened there over the next few minutes, during an interview he gave from his bed in a hospital in Hebron:

The settlers mercilessly hurled rocks at us from every direction. My kids were screaming. A stone hit my hand and I started to bleed. I had barely realized what was happening when a settler grabbed me and bashed my face with a metal pipe, then hit me in the head over and over. I fell to the ground, lost consciousness, and everything went dark. I fainted. I cannot remember anything beyond that point. But this fear, for my children — this horror — it continued.”

Those readers who find this report unreliable or not scandalous enough can simply watch this clip that documents part of it. This assault, which remains to this day, after more than a year, a case that the Israel Police has failed to identify the perpetrators of, serves as but one example for the way the farm outposts establish their control on the ground: by violence, at times bordering on murderousness, designed to expel Palestinians from extensive areas they and their communities depend on for their livelihood and way of life, their culture and identity.

Mitzpe Dotan Farm
Established in 2009 on the lands of the village of Ya’bad, west of Jenin

Grazing Allocations in the 1980s

The stipulations of this letter will not be made public...

Art. 10 in a document allocating grazing lands to the Reihan A settlement, February 1981

In the early 1980s, the military once again began allocating lands to the Settlement Division, so that it could transfer them to various settlements as grazing lands. A number of documents made available to us over the years through freedom-of-information requests (which present only part of the picture) suggest that in 1981-82, over 1,200 acres were allocated as grazing lands to four settlements:

- In February 1981, 250 acres were allocated to Reihan
- In March 1981, 250 acres were allocated to the Settlement Division in the Lucifer Police Station area in the south Hebron Hills, where about two years later the Beit Yatir settlement was established
- In November 1981, 200 acres were allocated to Shiloh
- In March 1982, 600 acres were allocated to Rimonim

These documents state explicitly that land allocations for grazing purposes have to be made without notifying anyone else besides the corresponding parties. The instruction pertaining to the confidentiality of the allocations can also be found in other documents drafted at the time, allocating lands for additional, similar purposes such as establishing new settlements or cultivation. In practice, however, to the best of our knowledge, these areas that have been allocated to settlers have never been used by settlers for grazing following their allocation, and neighboring Palestinian communities, whose historical grazing areas these were, continued using them for that purpose.

10. A 2018 document by the Professional Team for Formulating an Outline for the Legalization of Construction in the Judea and Samaria Area (i.e., the West Bank), better known as the Sandberg Report, describes how the allocation chain operates (see pp. 49-50).
Document ordering the allocation of 250 acres to Reihan A for the purpose of grazing, February 1981
On June 18, 1981, the then Head of the Civil Department in the State Attorney’s Office, Adv. Plia Albeck, sent a letter to the Military Advocate General. The list of recipients suggests that some of Israel’s top-ranking officials were discussing at the time the possibility of allocating grazing lands to several other settlements (beyond those mentioned above): Karnei Shomron, Tekoah, Kochav HaShachar, and probably another settlement the name of which was erased when the document was copied. We are unable to determine whether these allocations have ultimately been executed, and if they have, on what scope. In any case, it is clear that already in the 1980s, the most senior decision-makers realized that allocating lands for grazing was an effective means of seizing extensive areas in the West Bank.

Plia Albeck’s letter to the Military Advocate General regarding the allocation of lands for grazing for several settlements, June 18, 1981. Courtesy of Adv. Qamar Mishirqi Assad
Granting a Grazing License (Land Allocation) to the Har Sinais of Susiya

While searching for an appropriate place for our new way of life, we settled down in Susiya, in order to form the connection of roots in the land and roots in the sky. In the southern Hebron Hills, we were exposed to traditional agriculture...

Har Sinai Farm website

The concept of claiming lands by grazing was finally realized around the settlement of Susiya, established in 1983 on the lands of Yatta and its satellite villages in the southeastern Hebron Hills, in an area called Masafer Yatta. This area has relatively extensive grazing lands and sparse settler presence compared to other areas in the West Bank, even to this day. In an interview published in 2016 in the right-wing newspaper Makor Rishon, Susiya resident Dalia Har Sinai described how and why she and her partner at the time, Yair, who was murdered by Palestinians in 2001, chose to raise livestock:

Both of us, Yair and I, are originally from the Hefer Valley [on the coastal plain]. We grew up in farming communities... We began the process of returning to the faith after we got married and had children. We moved to Beit El [suburban settlement north of Ramallah], where we lived for four years, but then realized that we wanted to be farmers, and Beit El was not the right place for it. We started looking, and we found Susiya in the Hebron Hills. At the time, there were ten families here. The Arabs’ flocks arrived up to the settlement’s laundry lines, although the lands around us were state lands. After Yair began walking around with the Arab shepherds here and learned how they did it, he reached the conclusion that raising sheep would be the best way of protecting the lands... We were the first in Judea and Samaria, nobody was doing it. At first, people in the settlement project raised eyebrows – “Grazing is only for Arabs, what do Jews have to do with raising goats and sheep?” – but Yair did not give up and we bought a small flock. It wasn't easy... With the Arabs, the relations were based on mutual respect and suspicion. They were very flattered at first by having Yair following in their footsteps, he even mastered Arabic for that purpose. But then they saw how this meant that lands were getting back to our hands, and they became less enthusiastic... Every day, Yair would venture out with his flock to graze around Susiya, and little by little, the Arabs withdrew... In a process of 17 years, gradually, we created a reality with no parallel in Judea and Samaria, with 2,500 acres of grazing and farm lands.11

Har Sinai’s words are resonated in a 2004 document, which she submitted to the court during a case related to areas east of Susiya, on which she claimed rights. This document shows that in

1991, several years after the Har Sinais arrived in the area, the Settlement Division authorized
them to use an area of more than 1,000 acres, referred to in the document as the “Susiya
Square”, so that they would “be able to earn a livelihood and build a life”. Although there
are enough reasons to doubt the numbers stated by Har Sinai in the Makor Rishon piece with
reference to the area they took over in practice (2,500 acres) or the area mentioned in the
Settlement Division document (more than 1,000), it appears that the model of dispossession of
lands of Palestinian shepherds by settlers in the heart of the West Bank was first put in practice
in those years in the lands around Susiya. As seen below, it would be duplicated in additional
settlements soon enough.

A document by the Settlement Division confirming the allocation of 4,350 dunams (more than 1,000 acres)
to the Har Sinais. Courtesy of Adv. Qamar Mishirqi Assad
The Shepherd Outposts in the 1990s

But I liked apartheid… I still think apartheid is the best think in the world.

Yaakov Talia – south Hebron Hills

The Oslo Accords divided the West Bank between the PA and Israel for a five-year interim period. About 39% of the total area was transferred to the limited responsibility of the PA (Areas A and B), and the remaining 61% remained under full Israeli control (Area C). The fact that the West Bank was divided as an interim measure, following which a permanent agreement was to be signed, made grabbing lands in Area C an urgent matter for all those who sought to derail the process, of whom there were many. In late May 1996, one such person was elected the Prime Minister of Israel. Indeed, after the formation of the first Netanyahu government, dozens of new outposts began cropping up all over the West Bank. The large majority were intended for habitation only, with little or no significant farming activities in or around them. At the same time, however, some decided to follow the Har Sinai and establish outposts based on shepherding. In the second half of the 1990s, several shepherd outposts were established around the settlements of Beit Yatir (by Yaakov Talia), Itamar (Avri Ran), Kfar Tapuach (Avraham Herzlich), Maon (Yehoshafat Tor), Tene Omarim (Shlomo Mor), and Elon Moreh (Yitzhak Skali).

The only one of these outposts for which we have any kind of official document was established by Yaakov Talia north of Beit Yatir. Talia, who had arrived with his family a few years beforehand from South Africa, converted to Judaism and moved at first near the Khirbet Susiya archeological site, expropriated by Israel in 1986 and subsequently handed over to the settlers. In July 1996, some two weeks after the establishment of the first Netanyahu government, Beit Yatir gave Talia an area of 800 acres for the purpose of “cultivation and/or grazing” for a year. Although their contract terminated nearly a generation ago. The outpost still stands. Talia’s family members (he himself died in 2015 in a work accident) claim they have documents granting them rights to the land, even today.
Land allocation contract (~3200 dunams or 800 acres) between the settlement of Beit Yatir and Yaakov Talia.

Courtesy of Adv. Qamar Mishirqi Assad
Shepherd Farms Established in the Last Decade

In the farm, we’re raising a herd of sheep of some 4000 mothers who graze over an area of some 1,700 acres around Negohot… It’s very important, before you establish the farm, and I believe it works that way in most places, to conclude a grazing contract. Why? Because once I have a contract on my name, I’m in fact a kind of owner of the land…. This makes it much simpler to go up to the military and say, I have a herd trespassing on my land, I have a tractor here that’s trespassing and cultivating in my land. Let’s get on with something that thank God works perfectly, to harness the military behind the move as much as possible. Once you have something, it’s much simpler to use it…. When the herd is grazing the Arabs also see the herd and I find it no less important. It shows presence, it shows that we have returned to this land to cultivate it and that we believe it’s ours…. Personally, we also operate a UAV which oversees all the lands every day, because we know the herd cannot be everywhere at every given moment. The idea is to stop everything right at the start and not find yourself in a situation where suddenly after a month you tour the area and find that we have a new structure, and we have to handle it. Once you managed to catch a tractor or some other kind of truck…. At first, you stop it, impound the vehicles…. In fact, the goal is that once you found something you can call in the military. This is not the Wild West…

Haggai Nissim, Negohot Farm outpost

Establishing a new outpost is a task that requires legal knowledge, various technical skills, and significant financial resources. It is inconceivable that all this knowledge and these resources are available to the settlers actually populating these outposts, most of whom are in their twenties or early thirties. Moreover, these are business ventures that require at least several years to become economically self-sufficient. Their maintenance therefore requires long-term and continuous funding. In view of these facts, there is no doubt that the entire project is supported by public entities.

The Number of Farms and Outposts

I head 300 heads, today I’m left with 100. The settlers took away our mountains, and not enough food is left for the sheep and goats.

A. S. – south Hebron Hills

Currently, there are 77 settler farms and outposts of various sizes in the West Bank; grazing has played a key role in determining their location and usually also their income and economic basis. Out of those, 66 have been established over the past decade, and 46 in 2017-2021 alone –

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the years of the Trump administration and several Netanyahu governments. The unique political circumstances prevailing in those years, shaped among other things also by Netanyahu’s legal troubles that have made him increasingly dependent on the extreme right, have contributed significantly to the expansion of this phenomenon.

These outposts may be divided into three categories:

61 Permanent grazing outposts

9 New farming outposts established over the past decade, where the herding components is still secondary or even negligible, but may become significant in the future.

7 Satellite outposts – extensions of permanent shepherd outposts, some of which are occasionally established and evacuated.

The Total Area under Settler Control

At the Amana conference held in February 2021 titled “The Battle for State Lands”, from which we have hitherto borrowed several quotes, Ze’ev Hever, who has been heading the organization for several decades now, said that the area controlled by the farm outposts covers some 50,000 acres. The precise scope of that area is the question at the center of the research effort invested in the current project. To the best of our understanding, this is an underestimation: the area controlled by settlers as a consequence of having established these farms is closer to 60,000 acres, or just under 7% of Area C.
As mentioned above, this figure does not include all areas in the West Bank that Palestinians are prevented from accessing, or which they access at their peril. Not even close. The figure also does not reflect the whole of the area closed to Palestinian shepherds in recent years, since in parallel to the seizures made by settlers living in the shepherd outposts, we have seen a drastic increase in the size of the areas around settlements, or “ordinary” outposts, where the entry of Palestinians, particularly shepherds, has been prohibited or severely limited. Mapping these areas will require an additional and considerable effort, which should be made in order to present a more complete overview of the situation. It is also important to reiterate that defining a given territory as “controlled by settlers” does not necessarily reflect a dichotomous situation, but rather a continuum of control that favors the settlers and enables them to prevent or at least severely restrict Palestinian access thereto.

The Legal Status of Lands Seized by Settlers

Having completed the mapping of areas seized by settlers using the farm outposts, we now turn to their legal status, as determined by the Civil Administration. Our main findings are as follows:

- **Firing zones** – About 20,000 acres out of the area seized by settlers through the farm outposts, i.e., about a third of the total, overlaps with areas declared by Israel as “firing zones”, which are by definition “closed military areas” – closed to settlers as well. All these firing zones are located along the eastern strip of the West Bank, from the Tubas area to the north to Yatta to the south. This figure suggests that much of the settlers’ seizure efforts focus on the areas between the Palestinian villages along the main mountain ridge and the Jordan Valley. Historically, these have been the villages’ grazing areas, and in 1967-1972, Israel declared tens of thousands of acres in this area as “firing zones”. As explained below, the effort of seizing firing zones is evident in that many of the farm outposts have been deliberately established only a few feet from their boundaries.

- **Nature reserves** – About 10,000 acres of the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts are located within declared nature reserves where grazing is forbidden without authorization by the Nature and Parks Authority.

- **Palestinian Authority areas** – About 1,000 acres of the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts are located within PA administered territory. Some of these farm outposts have been deliberately established along the boundaries between Area C and the PA areas in order to deter Palestinians from entering Area C and to push them away from it.

13. The figures in this section are based on GIS layers provided by the Civil Administration over the years in response to our freedom-of-information requests.

14. For a map of firing zones in the West Bank, see “A Locked Garden”, p. 58.

15. Order 363 on the Protection of Nature. We do not know whether the authority has given grazing licenses to any of those settlers.

16. For further information about the seizure of PA lands by settlers, see Kerem Navot, “Israeli Violations of the Sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority”. The area controlled by settlers within PA territory totals some 2,500 acres, of which some 1,000 as a direct result of establishing farm outposts.
Types of Land Ownership

- **Registered state lands** – About 16,000 acres from the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts are officially registered as state lands.\(^{17}\)

- **Declared state lands** – About 12,000 acres from the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts are declared by Israel as “state lands”.\(^{18}\)

It therefore appears that some 32,000 acres of the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts are not officially registered nor declared by Israel as “state lands”. This means that this area cannot be officially allocated to settlers for any purpose, whether because the Israeli authorities recognize it as privately owned by Palestinians or because the status of its ownership has yet to be determined thereby. How can we classify these lands nevertheless?

- **Officially registered private lands** – About 10,000 acres of the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts are officially registered as private property, undoubtedly Palestinian property in all or nearly all cases.

- **Unregulated private lands** – About 11,000 acres of the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts have been mapped by the Civil Administration as Palestinian-owned lands because they are cultivated, albeit not officially registered. It should be noted that this mapping is often inaccurate, so we do not have precise information with regard to the size of the private area not officially registered.

- **Waqf lands** – About 500 acres of the total area seized by settlers through the farm outposts have been registered on behalf of the Islamic endowment.\(^{19}\)

- The remaining ~10,500 acres are not included in the ownership layers reported by the Civil Administration, and we are therefore unable to determine their legal status.

The conclusion is obvious: the claim that the farm outposts are established to “protect state lands” is a sham, a façade designed to enable the settlers to violently seize huge tracts of land in the West Bank, most of which are not state lands even according to Israel’s highly generous definitions. About one third of the area seized by settlers is located within areas declared as “firing zones”, which even Israelis are forbidden from entering. Other huge areas are located within nature reserves, where grazing is forbidden without authorization by the Nature and Parka Authority. As is well known, however, in the West Bank the law matters little when it does not serve the settlers’ dispossession interests. This is known full well to all those who have gained years-long experience in pushing the settlement project forward, particularly in its most recent and most violent incarnation.

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17. Israel began the process of registering land properties in the West Bank in 1968, and therefore these are property records made during the British Mandate (1918-1948) or Jordanian rule (1948-1967).
18. These are areas declared by Israel as “state lands” following the Elon Moreh HCJ in 1979.
A highly strategic position. Here, it guards areas belonging to the JNF and on state lands here in the sector. The farm is located on the last mountain between Gush Etzion and Jerusalem, creating an extremely important territorial continuity.

The Facebook page of the Neve Ori outpost

The locations of the outposts are carefully selected to avoid legal complications that would require their evacuation should petitioners demand their evacuation. Therefore, most outposts are located on lands registered as state lands, or lands declared by Israel as such, or lands that the settlers believe could be declared as such in retrospect since they are not registered as privately owned or as cultivated. The Civil Administration refers to the latter as “survey lands”. The location of buildings on “state” or “survey lands” is critical for preventing potential intervention by the High Court of Justice, which allows the state almost unlimited maneuvering space to legalize every illegal construction on land which it does not recognize to be under private Palestinian ownership. However, the location of temporary or permanent buildings erected by the settlers has nothing to do with the type of land ownership in the areas controlled by the settlers in practice around those outposts, which include extensive areas indubitably in private Palestinian ownership. The settlers’ (admittedly highly realistic) working assumption is that the law enforcement system has no intention or desire to protect the rights of Palestinian landowners to access their lands around those outposts. Consequently, the precise location of outpost buildings has become a negligible concern in the context of shaping the reality around the farm outposts.

A perfect example may be seen in an aerial photograph of the outpost established in 2019 by one Neria Ben Pazi south of the Rimonim settlement, on the lands of the Palestinian village of Taybeh, east of Ramallah. As you can see in the photo, the outpost is located at the edge of one plot registered in the Jordanian period (1948-1967) as state land, around which are hundreds of acres of private lands, in which the settlers of this outpost do not allow Palestinians to graze or cultivate. As mentioned, this method has been documented in dozens of other places.
Another major consideration behind the locations of the West Bank outposts is maximizing the seizure effect in the open areas around it. Therefore, the outpost must be distant enough from existing outposts or settlements, although not too distant, so that others could arrive quickly in the area and help the settlers in case of a violent clash with the same Palestinians they had come there to expel. Consequently, although only few inhabit each outpost, their ability to mobilize the armed forces of settlers and the military which provides close security services to all outposts ensures their local superiority over neighboring Palestinians, almost whenever they choose to establish a new outpost. To reiterate, each of the farm outposts is part of a regional system of additional settlements and outposts, acting in sync from different directions to seize maximum possible territory. This point is important since although most of the violence is caused by those settlers who are affiliated with these outposts, they do not all necessarily inhabit them all the time. In fact, there is high mobility across the various outposts and between them and the settlements, whose population serves as an essential manpower reserve for the outposts.

The determination of locations also involves another important consideration: the boundaries of areas declared as “firing zones” in the West Bank, particularly along the western edges of the Jordan Valley. Firing zones are formally declared as military areas closed to all citizens, apart from “permanent residents”. Israel refuses to recognize any of the inhabitants of the Palestinian communities residing within areas declared as “firing zones” as permanent residents, and officially claims that they inhabit the area illegally. In order to avoid legal complications in this regard as well, the precise locations of some of the new settlements are carefully selected so that the buildings are placed right on the edge of the firing zones, with the grazing areas seized by the settlers naturally located within them. This suggests that the authorities behind the farm outpost project have singled out those extensive areas declared by the military as “firing zones”, historically and often still used by the Palestinian communities as grazing areas necessary for their livelihood and way of life. Obviously, the military and Civil Administration are well aware of these details and enable the settlers to run wild in those fictitious firing zones.

According to multiple testimonies of Palestinians received by us, building the outposts right next to the firing zones serves an additional important goal: enabling the settlers to call in the

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20. Nearly 250,000 acres, or close to a fifth of the total area of the West Bank, have been declared by Israel as “firing zones”, but in nearly 80% of these lands no military training activity takes place. See “A Locked Garden”, pp. 9-10.
military and Civil Administration whenever they notice Palestinians cultivating lands or grazing
in these areas, designated as “closed military areas”. Coming from various areas in the West
Bank, such testimonies attest to the intensive and ongoing collaboration between the settlers,
the military and the Civil Administration, who work together to deny the Palestinians access to
very extensive areas. Such collaboration, in which the settlers serve as agents of sorts for state
authorities, should not come as a surprise. After all, what is being waged here is the “Battle for
Area C”, requiring the recruitment and close cooperation of all “units”.

**Funding**

*Over the past few years, we have been investing considerable resources in protecting
state lands through shepherd farms.*

The source of funding is a matter that those responsible for the farm outposts would rather
leave vague. As mentioned, since this project involves systematic violations of the law, the
funding organizations avoid providing clear-cut evidence that may get them in trouble.
Therefore, the data we are currently able to present are highly partial. We cannot determine
how much money has been invested in these outposts, although it is clearly in the order of
dozens of millions in NIS, if not more. These amounts are partly transferred directly to the
outposts and their inhabitants, whereas some are indirectly transferred to entities that provide
them with various services, primarily guarding and patrolling services in the areas the outpost
inhabitants seek to seize. The financial investment – including paving roads, purchasing sheep
or cattle herds, purchasing mobile structures some of which are mobilized on trucks bought
for this purpose, and equipment, utility and agricultural vehicles – is estimated at several
millions per outpost. As stated above, it is highly unlikely that anyone living in those outposts,
who are in their twenties and thirties, can spend such amounts out of pocket. Accordingly, it is
obvious that behind this campaign are public entities with substantial budgets, which finance
not only the establishment and upkeep of the outposts but also the settlers inhabiting them,

![Lechatchila Farm west of Mitzpe Yeriho upon its establishment in 2019](image)

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who need to make a living. Indeed, none of these farm outposts is profitable, and we may assume that they are at least several years from becoming so.\(^{22}\)

The following is a list of several bodies which we can say for certain are involved in funding farm outposts:

**Amana** – Clearly, the most dominant entity behind the establishment and funding of these outposts is the same organization responsible for the establishment of most of the long-standing outposts, which is often also involved in taking over Palestinian lands and forging various purchasing and property ownership documents. Amana is the most experienced organization when it comes to establishing outposts, and controls sizeable budgets. Since it is deliberately incorporated as a registered cooperative, Israeli law does not require it to report its finances, and there is no effective way of monitoring its money transfers to the outposts.

**The Settlement Division** – In October 2018, we published a comprehensive exposé about the involvement of the Settlement Division in extending loans to settlers living in illegal outposts, including loans dedicated to the purchasing of sheep or cattle herds and additional equipment required for establishing shepherd outposts.\(^{23}\)

**Local and regional councils** – The Israeli municipal authorities in the West Bank control areas of tens of thousands of acres and large public budgets of hundreds of millions of NIS annually. Their involvement is expressed in paving roads and providing logistical, security and legal assistance to the settlers in these farm outposts. They are also involved in recruiting financial and other support from the settlements, whose residents often consider those farm outposts to be “pioneers” acting in the name of the entire settlement project.\(^{24}\)

**The Ministry of Agriculture** has hitherto transferred millions to Kedma, Hashomer Yosh (Guardians of Judea & Samaria), and the Beit Yatir Mechina (“Pre-Military Academy”), NGOs that provide voluntary guarding services in the farm outposts.\(^{25}\)

**The Ministry of Education** has hitherto transferred millions to Kedma as well as to the Hebrew Shepherd NGO, which has established an illegal farm outpost west of Kfar Adumim, used as an educational institute for at-risk youth.\(^{26}\)

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22. One channel of transferring funds to settlers living in farm outposts is appointing them as military security coordinators (MSCs). In 2021, the Gush Etzion Regional Council appointed Yair Ben David and Yossi Levit as the MSCs of the illegal farm outposts they have established.


24. For example, the Shomron (Samaria) Regional Council has organized workshops for settlement officials in various farms within its jurisdiction.


The Ministry of Settlement transferred, in 2021, nearly 19 million NIS to thirteen regional and local councils in the West Bank for “creating and operating a land patrol platoon”. Presumably, some of these funds are also used for the establishment and upkeep of various farm outposts, “guarding state lands”.27

The Authority for National-Civic Service funds positions for women national service volunteers, who work in some of the farm outposts.28

The Ministry of Justice – In 2021, the Estates and Trusts Department allocated 200,000 NIS to Hashomer Yosh for the purpose of forming two “mobile teams” to protect “state lands” and purchasing UAVs.29

The Ministry of Tourism organizes tours for various groups, which also includes visits to farm outposts.30

The Chief Rabbinate’s Kosher Department provides Kosher validation to sheep and cattle herders living in farm outposts thereby enabling them to market their produce to the Jewish public.31

Ariel University offers academic credits to students who volunteer with Hashomer Yosh in farm outposts.32

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27. O. Ziv, “Data Reveal: This Is How the State Funds Settler Patrol Platoons”, Sicha Mekomit, April 18, 2022 (H).
29. See here for the full document (H).
30. For example, on March 20, 2022, the Ministry of Tourism held a tour for “reporters and bloggers in Samaria”, which included a visit to the Giv’ot Olam outpost, whose inhabitants are involved in violent takeovers of large areas (H).
31. See here for the full list of kosher-approved farms (H).
32. See on the organization’s Facebook page (H).
Subcontractors

In 2013, following the damages of the great storms, the extent of herd thefts and their damages throughout the State of Israel, and in Judea and Samaria in particular, became apparent. Sheds were shut down, others got into huge debts, the national strength and resilience was injured and humiliated.

From the Hashomer Yosh website

Like quite a few other public systems funded by the State of Israel, the system of land grabs in the West Bank has recently been privatized in part, and some of its work is currently done through various bodies fully or partly funded by the state. One of the most prominent in the context of land grabs around farm outposts is Hashomer Yosh, established in 2013. Since 2018, it has received over 5.6 million NIS from the state, mostly through the Ministry of Agriculture’s budget, for the purpose of “activity in farmlands in the Judea and Samaria Area”.

The organization’s official purpose is “strengthening the personal and economic security of the farmers, farms and herders in Judea and Samaria”. In practice, it serves as an armed militia taking active part in expelling Palestinians from areas settlers in farm outposts seek to seize. Its main activity is to transport volunteers to those farms to help their permanent settlers “guard”, that is, terrorize neighboring Palestinian communities. Indeed, its activists have often been documented taking part in violent acts. Two additional organizations funded by the Ministry of Agriculture for the same purpose are Kedma, which operates several student villages in the West Bank, and the Beit Yatir Mechina.

33. See here for information about government support for the organization (H).

A man with a Hashomer Yosh shirt threatening Israeli human rights activist Rabbi Arik Ascherman

Photo by Abdallah Abu Rahma
One of the major channels providing human and financial resources to the farm outposts is the recruiting of youth, many of whom are located somewhere on the risk spectrum. Some outposts have been established as “educational institutes” from the very beginning, but most have discovered their own “educational potential” after the fact. The recruitment of teenagers is intrinsic to the outpost system for several reasons: (1) It provides them with the cover of an essential social mission, giving them an extra layer of defense against impending evacuation – who can be publicly against rehabilitating at-risk youth? (2) Youth are a cheap and readily available human resource, which can usually be used with relative ease in order to execute the true mission of those outposts: uprooting Palestinians; and (3) presenting those outposts as “educational institutes” enables them to funnel huge funds from the state.34

Land Allocations

The management of state lands is a politically sensitive issue, and I don’t want the European Union to be notified about every piece of land that is built upon.

*MK Smotrich in a Constitution Committee hearing about the Settlement Division Bill, December 21, 2015 (H).*

Another critical issue that the authorities and settlers involved in establishing farm outposts go to great lengths to obfuscate is land allocations. Namely, the herding licenses that the settlers claim were issued allocating areas of land to them for grazing. To the best of our understanding, this obfuscation policy is motivated by three main considerations:

1. Based on the outposts’ locations and the ownership classification of the lands around them, we can say with certainty that some of the settlers in those outposts do not and cannot hold a valid grazing license from an entity authorized to issue one.

2. As seen below, even the few outposts that do have official allocation documents are not interested in being “bound” by the territory formally allotted to them, since they are active in taking over far larger territories.

3. The few grazing licensing that we have managed to locate ourselves attest to Israel’s dispossessive and racist land allocation policy in the West Bank. Clearly, the authorities have little interest in making those documents public. Each of these documents indicates that expansive areas have been transferred to single settlers, or to a couple as in the case of the Har Sinais.

34. Kerem Navot, “Educational Institutes as Cover Story – Only in the Occupied Territories”, October 30, 2019 (H).
In order to shed further light on the land allocations issue, in February 2019, we filed a freedom-of-information request with the Civil Administration, asking for data on land allocations to Israelis for the purpose of grazing. After some six months, the Civil Administration responded, claiming that the information in question is not available to it. We then submitted a freedom-of-information petition to the Jerusalem District Court, demanding that the Civil Administration share the information in question, despite its claim not to have it, since as the authority responsible for regulating land allocations in the West Bank, the Civil Administration is required to keep that information and offer it to public review. Following this petition, the Civil Administrations’ version was revised: apparently, it “managed” to locate several more grazing allocation documents from the 1980s (to which we have referred above). As for the rest, it claimed that searching for additional allocation documents would “require an inordinate allocation of resources”. Consequently, the petition was struck out and the information was not made public.

The very limited success of this petition is the result of a calculated move designed to enable the state to hide behind the back of the Settlement Division, whose entire activities, apart for financial matters, has been deliberately excluded from the purview of the Freedom of Information Law in an amendment to the “World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency (Status) Law”, initiated by MK Smotrich in 2015. Thus, at present, the legal situation enables the state to continue hiding behind the Settlement Division and claim that it does not have the documents, whereas the latter is free to claim that the Freedom of Information Law does not apply to its land allocation policy. However, as will shortly be described, about two years later the Civil Administration managed to come up with allocation contracts for six farm outposts.

35. Administrative Petition 6128-08-19, Kerem Navot et al. v. Civil Administration et al.
36. Art. 2 of World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency (Status) Law (Amendment No. 2), 2015 (H).
New information was obtained following a demand by Peace Now that the Ministry of Agriculture stop its money transfers to Hashomer Yosh, whose activists had been documented in multiple illegal outposts. The ministry rejected the demand, claiming it only financed the organization’s activities in outposts where there were land allocations approved by the Civil Administration. In support of this claim, the ministry attached to its response a document detailing the “support criteria” guiding it in calculating and transferring funds to the organizations and to two other aforementioned bodies that provide volunteers for work in those outposts, i.e., Kedma and the Beit Yatir Mechina. This is an important document because, for the first time, it sheds light on grazing allocations actually granted to settlers, revealing, among other things, why the settlers, with the help the authorities involved, try so hard to conceal that information:

1. Apparently, only very few of the outposts have land allocations approved by the Civil Administration. This places huge question marks on the allocations made, or more likely not made for dozens of other farm outposts. These question marks loom even larger and clearer when we examine the huge gaps between the sizes of the areas for which these three bodies requested support in 2019-2020 and those approved by the Ministry of Agriculture.

2. We can state with certainty that at least three of the settlers named in the document are involved in taking over areas many times larger than those allocated to them according to the document. Here are the three examples:

**Shabtai Koshlevsky** who established the Abraham Farm in the southwest Hebron Hills, argues on his Facebook page that the farm is “responsible for protecting some 9,000 dunams of state lands”, whereas his allocation according to the document is 2,000 dunams (500 acres), a huge area, granted, but less than a quarter of the area whose guardian angel is Koshlevsky.37

**Didi Amosi** (his Hebrew name is misspelled in the document), living in an outpost near the settlement of Rotem in the northern Jordan Valley, was allocated 370 dunams for grazing. However, his wife Shira Amosi gave a very different figure: “The areas around the settlement cover a territory of some 4,000 dunams, where we graze our sheep, thereby protecting the lands…”.38

**Neria Ben Pazi** (his Hebrew name is also misspelled in the document), mentioned above, who has established one of the most violent farm outposts in the West Bank south of Rimonim, seized an estimated area of more than 6,000 dunams, the great majority of which are officially registered as privately owned by Palestinians. However, officially, he was only allocated 546 dunams by the Civil Administration.39

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37. Abraham Farm’s [Facebook page](H).
38. Interview with Shira Amosi on the Yesha Council [website], September 9, 2017 (H).
מלון ישות
מטעים התמקדות פיתוחים ביניים והכליים
מקהל במספר

שנתית夫妇ות מצוות
3.6.2021
– אפריל 2021

2019-2020

1.zbekך שחרורו של אנשיים, ערבים בdniו להכלה במספר
שלשת הקץ שבא, תקצר את времי הקבע של הקניית
הكُمْנשה של יותר מ-10 דוכר
הາולות
2.צרך הכנה, מסך וקנישה של הקנישה של קבלן
שלשת הקץ שבא, מידי Inhalות
3.זוהר של מסיכנת בdniו💶 של הקנישה של קבלן
שלשת הקץ שבא, מידי Inhalות
4.זוהר של מסיכנת בdniו💶 של הקנישה של קבלן
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שלשת הקעז שבא, מידי Inhalות
## מודגנס ישראל

משרדי התכלית בתל אביב
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### תקציב שנתי

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יתרונות נוספים ש الفقرות מייצרו: 75% מקוונים усиול, 25% נוספים усиול והחובב משמשים. בטוחה, עם כל תחילה, יוכלו לשלב גם פעילויות נוספות בתוכניות שונות.

הפקת חנים хозריים, פיתוחה מוניציפלי והauctionים שוליות. הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights, מוניציפלי והauctionים שוליות. הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights, מוניציפלי והauctionים שוליות. הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights, מוניציפלי והauctionים שוליות. הפקת חנים хозריים בת Heights

בירה, אך לא היה כל сентяית עם פעילות חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפת של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותפות של כל חיות משותftar

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* lucrונות ניועים, ד"ר שמעון אילן,י. ד. 30 ב"צ 2020*
Ministry of Agriculture document detailing the “criteria for supporting volunteer groups in agricultural settlements and agricultural volunteers”, June 3, 2021. Courtesy of Peace Now
Settler: 1 – Land Area: 900 Acres

One allocation stands out in the Ministry of Agriculture document: 900 acres handed out to one lucky man: Yehoshafat Tor, one of the founders of Havat Maon (Maon Farm) in the south Hebron Hills – one of the most violent outposts in the West Bank. This information is cross-referenced with a document photocopied by a Taayush activist while accompanying Palestinian shepherds, on Saturday, February 9, 2019: the grazing contract signed between the Settlement Division and Tor, in early 2019, for a period of one year, entitling the latter to graze over 900 acres, a huge area equivalent to some 90% of the Maon settlement’s jurisdiction.40 However, as Tor had neither the need nor the ability to control all that huge territory in practice, in 2020 an additional farm outpost was established by a settler named Yissachar Mann, Tor’s former neighbor in Havat Maon, previously suspected, just like Tor, of violent nationalist activity.41 We may therefore conclude that very little imagination is required to suspect why the Civil Administration, only two years previously, could not muster the “resources” in order to try to locate the grazing allocation contracts that we had asked for – the same contracts that the Ministry of Agriculture miraculously provided two years later.

Grazing contract signed between the Settlement Division and Yehoshafat Tor of the illegal outpost Havat Maon. Photocopied by Taayush activists on February 9, 2019